The Epistemology of Perception

Susanna, Siegel; Silins, Nicholas

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.040

Cited by 53 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…To generalize: it seems uncontroversial that perceptual experiences provide me with some 'normative support' for beliefs or judgments about my surroundings (see, e.g., Siegel and Silins, 2015). Moreover, it can be argued that my perceptual experiences also provide me with some normative support for judgments about my own mental states.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It consists in contrasting perceptual experiences with other kinds of experiences, which either lack normative force (like imagining) or exhibit a different kind of normative force (like believing). Since I do not intend to provide a full-blown theory of perceptual justification, I will restrict myself to some aspects that are relevant for the present purposes (for a more detailed survey, see Siegel and Silins, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Normative Force of Perceptual Justification

Dewalque¹

2015

Normativity in Perception

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Normative Force of Perceptual Justification

Dewalque¹

2015

Normativity in Perception

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“…Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system (e.g., visual, auditory, haptic). Such cognitive influences may include not only knowledge, beliefs, intentions, expectations and goals, but also desires, moods, feelings and so on (see Rowlands ; Raftopoulos ; Lyons ; Macpherson ; Siegel 2012; 2013; Stokes ; Siegel and Silins forthcoming. )…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity

Cecchi

2014

Dialectica

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Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system (e.g., visual, auditory, haptic). The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system (defined as early vision) which I call 'architectural'. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study in perceptual learning which provides empirical evidence that cognitive influences in the visual system produce neural reorganization in the primary visual cortex. The type of cognitive penetration can be synchronic and diachronic.

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“…But if perceptual learning and/or the cognitive penetration theses are true, then this foundationalist position would be false: perception is not a reliable, objective source of information about the world, because it is or has been influenced by our beliefs, desires, and expectations. Siegel and Silins state: “[If] what you see is determined by what you already fear, suspect, or believe to be the case, then these penetrating psychological states seem to stack the tribunal of experience in their favor, preventing us from using experience to rationally assess our beliefs, fears, or suspicions” (, 803).…”

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confidence: 99%

Experiencing Gendered Seeing

Tullmann¹

2017

The Southern J of Philosophy

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This paper explores the concept of "gendered seeing": the capacity to visually perceive another person's gender and the role that one's own gender plays in that perception. Assuming that gendered properties are actually perceptible, my goal is to provide some support from the philosophy of perception on how gendered visual experiences are possible. I begin by exploring the ways in which sociologists and psychologists study how we perceive one's sex and the implications of these studies for the sex/gender distinction. I then discuss feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff's concept of "interpretative horizons," which highlights the role that one's social and political identities play in how we understand the world around us. I also discuss Elizabeth Grosz's notion (borrowed from Merleau-Ponty) of double sensation. I then apply some work in the philosophy of perception on perceptual learning and the cognitive penetration of perception to gendered seeing. My hypothesis is that we can explain how one's interpretative horizons are acquired through some notion of perceptual learning. I conclude by suggesting some of the epistemic and ethical implications of gendered seeing."To see . . . entails more than opening our eyes to allow light passively to bounce off our retinas. We must actively perceive that which is seen and thus make sense of somatic experiences. . . . In this way, sensing and this sense-making are necessarily conjoined, codetermined, and mutually emergent." -Vanninni, (Waskul and Gottschalk 2011,15) "A man would never hold a pen like that." -Dee, MTF cross-dresser, age 55 (quoted in Friedman 2015, 84)

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The Epistemology of Perception

Cited by 53 publications

References 70 publications

The Normative Force of Perceptual Justification

The Normative Force of Perceptual Justification

Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity

Experiencing Gendered Seeing

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