Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

Abstract

A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau's influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our "phenomenal" and "material" concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can't co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn't be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an "intuition of distinctness" will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).

Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?

“…So, most of the philosophical discussion about Fallacy Accounts has been focused on the problem of knowing whether or not it was possible to defend physicalism against the dualist intuition by interpreting this intuition as something illusory (Demircioğlu, 2013;Gertler, 2001;Goff, 2011;Levine, 2007;Nida-Rümelin, 2007). Some critical attention was also given to the peculiar features of phenomenal concepts which, in the various accounts, are supposed to explain the arising of the illusion (Dove & Elpidorou, 2016;Shea, 2014;Sundström, 2008). 7 Loar describes this illusion as something that is created during "our philosophical ruminations", which seems to confirm that what he had in mind was a cognitive illusion, rather than a perceptual one.…”

Phenomenal Concepts

“…Sundström (2008) raises the same type of objection against Papineau’s ‘quotational’ phenomenal concept account of the intuition of brain‐consciousness distinctness.…”

What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?

“…Recently Pär Sundström (2008) has queried this account of the source of our dualist intuitions. He argues that it predicts dualist intuitions in cases where there are none.…”