Constitutional Politics in Southeast Asia: From Contestation to Constitutionalism?

Dressel, Bjoern; Bünte, Marco

doi:10.1355/cs36-1a

Cited by 20 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Indonesian constitutional reform occurred in 1999-2002 when the country faced a political and economic crisis. In terms of quality of process in the Indonesian constitutional reform, it was conducted in manners of gradualist, with minimal consultation, and dominated by members of parliament (Dressel & Bunte, 2014;Horowitz, 2013). Moreover, the reform processes lacked some key features of the democratic process in making the constitution, such as short-term political interests contaminating the amendment proposals, no clear plan or objective, little public participation, and the MPR failure in its capacity as a constitution maker to win the people's trust (Indrayana, 2005;2007).…”

Section: Indonesia's Constitutional Reform 1999-2002 and Re-establishmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Existing Performance of Indonesia’s Audit Board: Informal Networks, Constitutional Makers’ Decision, and Constitutional Reform

Baidhowah

2020

JTAKEN

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This study seeks to explain the process of Audit Board article amendment in the constitutional reform as the source of current BPK’s performance, by answering questions: how much do informal networks influence constitutional maker’s decision and to what extent do the external pressures influence the informal networks on the amendment of Audit Board article? This study used a quantitative method to develop variables of social networks in examining how much informal networks based on ideational informal networks influence constitutional makers’ voting between 1999 and 2001 in six meetings which contained voting out of 39 meetings of the Audit Board article amendment. Illustrating statistically significant results of the influence of ideational informal networks on the constitutional makers’ decisions and the influence of high political effect (president’s preference) and strong party pressure on the ideational informal networks, this study shows that “the progressive liberal bloc” which can enforce constitutional reform – particularly Audit Board article though not full-scale reform – within the “ineffective formal institution” as it happened in transition era, has shown how informality’s outcome is in line with formality’s outcome, so it causes improved performance of Audit Board today. Because the statistical evidence talks to broader topics about the people representative bodies and governance, this study suggests paying more attention to the factors of constitutional makers’ networks, on and off the meetings of constitutional reform.

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Section: Indonesia's Constitutional Reform 1999-2002 and Re-establishmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Existing Performance of Indonesia’s Audit Board: Informal Networks, Constitutional Makers’ Decision, and Constitutional Reform

Baidhowah

2020

JTAKEN

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“…6. As such it is part of the general contestation of state elites that cannot only be found around state institutions, but also human rights, the role of the military and judicial institutions, which are in flux in Southeast Asia (see Dressel & Bünte, 2014;Bünte & Dressel, 2017).…”

Section: Conclusion: the Inutility Of Institutionalism In The Southeamentioning

confidence: 99%

Perilous presidentialism in Southeast Asia?

Bünte

Thompson

2017

Contemporary Politics

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Regional patterns have long been crucial to debates about presidentialism starting with the Latin American cases in which presidential systems were seen to have contributed to political instability. This special issue examines four cases of presidentialism in Southeast Asia. Both the 'first' wave of the presidentialism literature which focuses on 'pure' cases of presidentialism, and the 'second' wave, which concentrates on a complex mixture of presidentialism and other institutions, are relevant to Southeast Asia. Among 'pure' presidential systems, the Philippines appears to provide support to 'the perils of presidentialism' thesis given the collapse of democracy there several decades ago and periodic instability since then. But Indonesia, despite ostensibly having the additional institutional perils of multipartism, has proved stable. Among the hybrid cases of presidentialism, both Myanmar and Timor Leste have forged elite accommodation through creating presidential-style institutions, including one considered particularly unpromising for achieving political stability in the literature. Because presidentialism has been associated both with elite accommodation and stability as well as political conflict and instability, the Southeast Asia cases do not clearly demonstrate the dangers of presidentialism. They point instead to the relative lack of explanatory power of this institutional arrangement in understanding political stability.

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“…Die philippinische Verfassungsentwicklung ist geprägt durch US-amerikanische Einflüsse, während sich die Verfassungen von Brunei, Malaysia und Singapur stärker am britischen Vorbild orientieren und das osttimorische Grundgesetz lusophon geprägt ist. Infolge dieser Entwicklung sind die Verfassungen zusehends eklektisch und nähern sich einander inhaltlich an Dressel und Bünte 2014). Historische Erfahrungen des nationalen Befreiungskampfes (Indonesien, Vietnam, Laos), "Lehren" aus dem Missbrauch der Verfassung durch autoritäre Herrscher (Philippinen) und die internationale Diffusion von Normen und Rechtsvorstellungen sind weitere wichtige Einflüsse.…”

Section: Verfassungsentwicklung Und -Prinzipienunclassified

Die politischen Systeme Südostasiens

Croissant¹

2016

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Constitutional Politics in Southeast Asia: From Contestation to Constitutionalism?

Cited by 20 publications

References 48 publications

Explaining Existing Performance of Indonesia’s Audit Board: Informal Networks, Constitutional Makers’ Decision, and Constitutional Reform

Explaining Existing Performance of Indonesia’s Audit Board: Informal Networks, Constitutional Makers’ Decision, and Constitutional Reform

Perilous presidentialism in Southeast Asia?

Die politischen Systeme Südostasiens

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