Contract and product quality in platform selling

Zhang, Jianqiang; Cao, Qingning; He, Xiuli

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2018.07.023

Cited by 186 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…In order to answer the above questions, an eSC, where the manufacturer relies on the third-party platform (hereinafter, the platform) for product sales is constructed. The operation mode, where the manufacturer sells products directly to consumers and the platform provides sales service, is similar to the revenue sharing between the manufacturer and the platform in Zhang et al [16], who explored the platform's operating models, but they did not consider the platform's sales service. In this study, the sales service level is used as the decision variable of the platform for analysis.…”

Section: Main Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

E-Commerce Supply Chain Models under Altruistic Preference

Wang

Shen

et al. 2021

Mathematics

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This paper reviews the decisions, coordination contract, and altruistic preference of an e-commerce supply chain (eSC) composed of a manufacturer and a third-party e-commerce platform (platform). The research derives optimal decisions in a decentralized model with altruistic preference; it is indicated that altruistic preference can help increase the sales price and sales service level. Although the platform’s altruistic preference is not beneficial to its own profits, it can help increase the manufacturer’s profits. Moreover, when the degree of altruistic preference is kept within a limit, the profit of the decentralized system is higher in a model with altruistic preferences, which indicates that altruistic preference can contribute toward maintaining a friendly, harmonious, and cooperative a relationship between the platform and manufacturers. Contrary to a traditional offline supply chain, where the sales price is the lowest in the centralized model, the sales price is highest in a centralized eSC model. In the proposed coordination contract, the platform with a certain degree of altruistic preference offers zero-commission sales service and charges a certain amount for a fixed professional service fee. The proposed contract is more applicable to products whose market demands are less affected by sales prices and more affected by the sales service level.

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Section: Main Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

E-Commerce Supply Chain Models under Altruistic Preference

Wang

Shen

et al. 2021

Mathematics

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“…Moreover, two common contracts are offered by e-tailers to manufacturers: the revenue sharing contract where a platform appropriates a portion of the manufacturer's revenue, and the fixed fee contract where a platform charges a fixed rent for each sale. Compared with the revenue sharing scheme, the fixed fee scheme leads to a higher price, a higher quality, and a (weakly) smaller market size [9]. It is well known that product quality and environmental conditions fluctuate over time.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Online shopping green product quality supervision strategy with consumer feedback and collusion behavior

Zhu

2020

PLoS ONE

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With the development of e-commerce, online shopping has become one of the most important consumer channels. However, the lack of government supervision, insufficient review of e-commerce platforms, illegal sales of online sellers and invalid consumer complaints have led to frequent green product quality problems during online shopping. Therefore, this paper considers that the online seller may be driven by interests, colluding with the e-commerce platform and selling low quality green product. At the same time, we introduce consumer feedback, and take the government supervision department, the online seller and the e-commerce platform as actors of the evolutionary game. In this paper, the evolutionary strategy choices of each actor were analyzed, and the influence of different factors on the evolutionary stability results was explored. Research indicates: firstly, consumer complaints play an indirect regulatory role for the online seller; secondly, the enhancement of the losssharing relationship between the online seller and the e-commerce platform can promote the legal operation of the two and prevent collusion; thirdly, the impact of consumer complaints on the choice of the e-commerce platform depends on the government supervision department's penalty for the e-commerce platform; finally, the e-commerce platform establishes a reasonable reward system, which can make up for the defects of the online seller using advanced technology to avoid punishment. Our paper uses Matlab 2017 for simulation analysis and provides effective advices on how to urge the government supervision department to effectively supervise, promote the e-commerce platform to enhance review, urge the online seller to legal sale, and encourage consumers to legally defend their rights.

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“…Li Wei and Chen Jing (2018) [21] develop game-theoretic models in which the retailer sells a product in two quality-differentiated brands to demonstrate that the quality difference. Zhang J et al (2019) [22] use an analytical model to study the interrelationship between a platform's contract choice and a manufacturer's product quality decision.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thereafter, we use first-order and second-order optimal conditions with respect to q R in formula (22), which yields the following:…”

Section: Product Quality Strategy In Retail Channelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply chain product quality control strategy in three types of distribution channels

Zhu

2020

PLoS ONE

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Based on a three-stage stackelberg dynamic game analysis, this paper constructs a product quality control strategy model for three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel and mixed channel) in a three-echelon supply chain, which is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and the final customer. This paper studies how to design a distribution channel strategy and provides a product quality control strategy. Furthermore, this paper analyzes three types of distribution channels strategy in the context of how they influence a manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, a retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision. We compare the manufacturer's product quality level, quality prevention effort level, wholesale price, direct sale price and the retailer's quality inspection effort level, retail price in three types of distribution channels and determine the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits function and the final customer's consumer surplus. In addition, we introduce the distribution channels demand elasticity ratio to analyze the influence of determining the product quality control strategy. Most importantly, we conduct a numerical sample analysis that will prove the model's effectiveness and indicate a specific application in practice.

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Contract and product quality in platform selling

Cited by 186 publications

References 28 publications

E-Commerce Supply Chain Models under Altruistic Preference

E-Commerce Supply Chain Models under Altruistic Preference

Online shopping green product quality supervision strategy with consumer feedback and collusion behavior

Supply chain product quality control strategy in three types of distribution channels

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