Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games

Lipman, Barton L.

doi:10.1007/bf00128880

Cited by 41 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Both players can discern and react to the magnitude of these rewards and the possibilities of attaining them. However, when players cannot communicate and make commitments to each other, each player is wary of the other player's tendency to take advantage of the situation and defect (Lipman, 1986). The knowledge that when only one player defects, the other is left with the lowest possible payoff leads to individual defection becoming more likely.…”

Section: A Game-theoretic Analysismentioning

confidence: 94%

Faculty evaluation as a social dilemma: a game theoretic approach

Grant¹,

Fogarty²

1998

Accounting Education

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This paper considers issues pertaining to accounting faculty performance evaluation as it is generally applied in the United States. How performance is evaluated is a question of interest to all stakeholders in the enterprise of accounting education, particularly in the light of recent changes in the educational environment. Some characteristics of faculty performance evaluation are institutionspecific. For example, the number of years of service required before a tenure decision can vary across universities, and the level of formality in the evaluation process is not uniform. Furthermore, some business schools do not use the separate academic department structure. Regardless of these differences, evaluation is typically a function of the faculty member's research, teaching, and service contributions, and precise expectations are rarely fully specified, leaving open the question of just how any particular contributions are evaluated. We use game theory to create a model of faculty efforts and outcomes within a social dilemma; and we develop interdependent social dilemmas, two social dilemmas played simultaneously. Within accounting academia, these two dilemmas represent the resource allocation among departments within a business school, and the payoff scenarios facing individual faculty within an accounting department. The interdependence arises because the payoffs available in each dilemma simultaneously depend on the outcome of the other. Our model highlights the dependence of group performance and resulting resource availability on the distribution of faculty efforts toward the attainment of personal and collective goals. The results indicate the possibility of increasing the resources available to all by recognizing a broader definition of faculty contribution. Placing faculty evaluation within the social dilemma context can improve both departmental and individual outcomes by encouraging both collective and individual efforts.Faculty, Performance, Evaluation, Research, Teaching, Service, Tenure, Interdependent, Social Dilemma, Game Theory, Resources,

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Section: A Game-theoretic Analysismentioning

confidence: 94%

Faculty evaluation as a social dilemma: a game theoretic approach

Grant¹,

Fogarty²

1998

Accounting Education

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“…Many characteristics of this game make it useful for approximating real-world competition (Axelrod 1984;Lipman 1986) including competition in business, in general (Burke 1988;DiBenedetto 1986), and advertising, in particular. First, in advertising spending decisions, the possible courses of action are well-defined.…”

Section: Exhibit 1 Riskiness Of Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Role of Information in Setting Advertising Budgets

Corfman

Lehmann

1994

Journal of Advertising

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This study examines OOw advertising budget setting, framed as a prisoner's dilemma, is affected by information on the competitive situation and characteristics of the decision maker. Hypotheses are tested using experiments in which subjects set advertising budgets. Results indicate that subjects were generally competitive, but also based their strategy selections on what they expected their opponents to do, what their opponents did last time, whether the competitive relationship was expected to continue, market shares, and whether the subject's profit objectives were short-or long-term. Individual differences also played a part in determining strategy selection. IntroductionAdvertising budgeting continues to be a controversial topic. The recent switch in emphasis from advertising to promotion spending has had a major impact on the advertising industry and touched off a spirited debate on the long-run effects of advertising and promotion. Part of this debate suggests that, by using promotion in place of advertising, managers are making less than optimal decisions. Yet, surprisingly little is known about how managers actually set advertising budgets and little attention is paid to this issue. For example, Muncy (1991) found that only nine of 603 articles published in the Journal of Advertising over the preceding 20 years focused on budgets.The payoffs from advertising budgeting decisions (and most other management decisions) depend not only on the decision-maker's own actions, but on the actions of other parties as well. This is particularly true in competitive environments. Advertising, promotion, pricing, and product quality decisions, for example, are all decisions where payoffs are determined, in part, by competitive reaction. This study is designed to contribute to our understanding of some of the important information and decisionmaker characteristics that affect the advertising budget decision. Many studies have addressed what information managers should. use, but little research confronts what they actually use in forming their strategies and how their personalities and experience affect their choices.To explore these questions we begin with a prisoner's dilemma, presented as the management decision task of setting advertising budgets for four regional brands of a mature product in a duopoly, and examine when decision-makers make choices due to information or individual tendencies not incorporated in the standard prisoner's dilemma. Information available for their use includes the profits possible for both firms, the history and duration of the competitive relationship, relative market share, and profit objectives.Findings indicate that when the classic prisoner's dilemma is enriched to represent more closely the complex strategic task of setting advertising budgets, subjects often do not adhere to the normative recommendations of the basic game. Specifically, we found that subjects generally set high advertising budgets and predicted that their opponents would set low advertising budgets more often than th...

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“…This research has focused almost exclusively on the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game (e.g., Axelrod, 1987;Axelrod and Dion, 1988;Bendor et al, 1991;Boerlijst et al, 1997;Kraines, 1989, 1995;Lindgren, 1991;Nowak and May, 1992;Nowak et al, 1995;Nowak and Sigmund, 1992, 1993, 1998Wu and Axelrod, 1995). Among the few who have studied the evolution of behaviour in other games are Binmore and Samuelson (1992); Crowley (2001);Friedman (1996); Lipman (1986); Posch (1999); and Roth and Erev (1995). However, even among the simplest strategic games, namely dyadic (two-player) games in which each player has just two strategies, there are 12 ordinally distinct, symmetric 2 × 2 games (Rapoport and Guyer, 1966).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games

Browning

Colman

2004

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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A genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossing-over was used to investigate the evolution of social behaviour in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken (Hawk-Dove), Battle of the Sexes, and Leader games. The results show that the strategic structure of an interaction has a crucial determining effect on the type of social behaviour that evolves. In particular, simulations using repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken (Hawk-Dove) games lead to the emergence of genes coding for symmetric reciprocity and the evolution of mutual cooperation, whereas simulations using repeated Battle of the Sexes and Leader games lead to nearfixation of genes coding for asymmetric strategic choices and the evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity. A mechanism is suggested whereby, in games with asymmetric equilibrium points, coordinated alternating reciprocity might evolve without insight or communication between players.

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Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games

Cited by 41 publications

References 12 publications

Faculty evaluation as a social dilemma: a game theoretic approach

Faculty evaluation as a social dilemma: a game theoretic approach

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Role of Information in Setting Advertising Budgets

Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games

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