Cooperation and age structure in spatial games

Wang, Zhen; Zhu, Xiaodan; Arenzon, Jeferson J.

doi:10.1103/physreve.85.011149

Cited by 122 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Other approaches facilitating the evolution of cooperation include the introduction of noises to payoffs and updating rules [22][23][24][25][26][27], asymmetry between interaction and replacement graphs [28,29], diversity [30][31][32][33][34], differences between time scales of game dynamics [33,[35][36][37], interaction stochasticity [38], as well as the adoption of simultaneous different strategies against different opponents [39]. Somewhat more personally-inspired features supporting the evolution of cooperation involve memory effects [40], heterogeneous teaching activity [41][42][43], preferential learning [44,45], aspiration [46][47][48], age [49], rationality [50], myopically selective interactions [51,52], local contribution [53], and coevolutionary partner choice [54][55][56][57], to name but a few examples studied in recent Email address: yongkuiliu@163.com (Yongkui Liu).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does migration cost influence cooperation among success-driven individuals?

Liu

Chen

Lin

et al. 2012

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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Migration as an important social factor has been recently considered in evolutionary games on graphs. However, the migration-related cost is largely ignored in previous works, which may indeed influence individual migration decision in human society.Here we propose a model of the success-driven migration with migration costs where individuals decide whether to migrate or not according to the migration cost and expected payoff. We consider two different calculation schemes for the migration cost, i.e., distance-dependent and distance-independent costs, and study their effects on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma, respectively. It is found that although the migration cost inhibits the migration of individuals, it does not necessarily lead to the suppression of cooperation. We explain the phenomenon by investigating the spatial patterns of cooperators and defectors. Interestingly, the curves of cooperation exhibit step structures and the corresponding heuristic analysis is provided. Our work complements previous studies and deepens the understanding regarding the success-driven migration on the evolution of cooperation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does migration cost influence cooperation among success-driven individuals?

Liu

Chen

Lin

et al. 2012

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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“…[12][13][14][15][16][17]. In particular, network reciprocity [11,[18][19][20], whose principle has an appealing physical interpretation (cooperators are better off when they are surrounded by cooperators), has recently attracted interest in the physics community [21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33]. Quite interestingly, it has been found that, in contrast to what happens in spatially homogeneous (wellmixed) populations, the arrangement of individuals according to certain topologies can lead to very different scenarios.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Facilitators on networks reveal optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity

2014

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Article:Szolnoki, A, Perc, M and Mobilia, M (2014) Facilitators on networks reveal optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity. Physical Review E, 89 (4). 042802. ISSN 1539-3755 https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.89.042802 eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version -refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher's website. TakedownIf you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.PHYSICAL REVIEW E 89, 042802 (2014) Facilitators on networks reveal optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity Reciprocity is firmly established as an important mechanism that promotes cooperation. An efficient information exchange is likewise important, especially on structured populations, where interactions between players are limited. Motivated by these two facts, we explore the role of facilitators in social dilemmas on networks. Facilitators are here mirrors to their neighbors-they cooperate with cooperators and defect with defectors-but they do not participate in the exchange of strategies. As such, in addition to introducing direct reciprocity, they also obstruct information exchange. In well-mixed populations, facilitators favor the replacement and invasion of defection by cooperation as long as their number exceeds a critical value. In structured populations, on the other hand, there exists a delicate balance between the benefits of reciprocity and the deterioration of information exchange. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations of social dilemmas on various interaction networks reveal that there exists an optimal interplay between reciprocity and information exchange, which sets in only when a small number of facilitators occupy the main hubs of the scale-free network. The drawbacks of missing cooperative hubs are more than compensated for by reciprocity and, at the same time, the compromised information exchange is routed via the auxiliary hubs with only marginal losses in effectivity. These results indicate that it is not always optimal for the main hubs to become leaders of the masses, but rather to exploit their highly connected state to promote tit-for-tat-like behavior.

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“…After the seminal paper, a large amount of works are devoted to exploring factors of promoting cooperation on lattices, such as, punishment and reward [8][9][10], reputation [11,12], weight [13,14], age structure [23], and others (see [16][17][18][19][20][21][22]), etc.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

External Environmental Impact for Evolutionary Prisoner's Games on Lattices

Gao¹,

Song²

2017

Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Applied Mathematics, Modeling and Simulation (AMMS 2017)

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Abstract-This paper studies the role of external environment in the evolution of cooperation. Due to the bounded rationality of players, external environment of individuals does matters on the evolution. The more the amount of cooperators a player's neighborhood has, expectantly, the more confident the player will be in its current choice. Based on this point, two updating rules on regular lattices are introduced concerning external environmental effects. For the first rule, a focal player's payoff is affected proportionally with the difference between the number of cooperators and that of defectors in its group; in the second case, one's payoff is exponentially effected by that difference in its neighbors. On account of the external influence to central individuals, simulation results show that the external environment exerts a significant positive function on the increasing of cooperation level in populations.

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Cooperation and age structure in spatial games

Cited by 122 publications

References 59 publications

Does migration cost influence cooperation among success-driven individuals?

Does migration cost influence cooperation among success-driven individuals?

Facilitators on networks reveal optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity

External Environmental Impact for Evolutionary Prisoner's Games on Lattices

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