Coordination contract design for the newsvendor model

Li, Linqiu; Liu, Ke

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2019.10.045

Cited by 16 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Sun et al [28] explored the impact of digital showroom strategies on channel profits in the context of a dual-channel supply chain, and verified that the use of quantity discount and anti-showroom revenuesharing joint contract can achieve supply chain channel coordination. Li and Liu [29] considered a newsboy model composed of suppliers and retailers, and compared the conditions that wholesale price contracts should meet to realize supply chain coordination in the case of symmetric information and asymmetric information. Liu et al [30] investigated the effect of retailer risk preference on supply chain decisions based on two supply chain structures, supplier-led and retailer-led, and demonstrated that these two structures can be coordinated under the same conditions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Channel Contract Coordination for Supply Chain With Behavior Preferences Under Uncertainties

Zhu,

Zhang,

et al. 2023

IEEE Access

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This paper studies the coordination of a dual-channel supply chain with behavior preferences under uncertainties of yield and demand. According to an improved FS model and mean-CVaR criterion, we construct optimal decision models in the centralized and decentralized situations, and propose the joint contract of revenue-sharing and risk-sharing to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Furthermore, this paper investigates the effects of fairness concerns and risk-averse preferences on supply chain members' profits and decisions, and studies the feasible region for joint contracts to achieve Pareto improvement. This paper finds that: 1 fairness concerns and risk aversion preferences exacerbate the double marginalization effect, 2 fairness concerns and risk aversion have a negative impact on manufacturer's decision in a manufacturer-led dual-channel supply chain, 3 the possibility of joint contract to achieve coordination increases with the increases of degree of fairness concerns and risk aversion.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Channel Contract Coordination for Supply Chain With Behavior Preferences Under Uncertainties

Zhu,

Zhang,

et al. 2023

IEEE Access

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“…To compare with related literature and better display our contributions, we list them in Table 1. [18] started from the two situations of demand information symmetry and information asymmetry, and studied how to design contracts in the newsvendor model, which can not only meet the two characteristics of incentive compatibility and individual rationality, but also achieve the purpose of coordinating the supply chain. However, their study did not consider the uncertain production and demand situation.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty

Liu

2022

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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Perishable and short-life products can be seen everywhere in life. Due to the particularity of these products, they are more complicated in supply chain management. This paper studies whether the two-part tariff and ZRS contract can achieve the purpose of reducing risks and coordinating supply chain. We assume that market demand and supplier yield are uncertain, and we use game theory and probability distribution for research. The research results show that when the information is asymmetric, the manufacturer always ignore the demand forecast information provided by the retailer under the wholesale price contract. When the demand is uncertain, regardless of whether the information is symmetric or asymmetric, the two-part tariff contract and the ZRS contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve maximum profit. When the retailer's degree of risk aversion is high, the ZRS contract is better than the two-part tariff, which can reduce the risk of retailers and achieve the purpose of coordinating the supply chain. When the supply is uncertain, the manufacturer can provide the supplier with a risk-sharing contract, including the return price and the sharing ratio that meet certain constraints. Such a contract can effectively reduce the supplier's risk and realize supply chain coordination.

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“…Currently, there is an increasing trend of inter-firm competition shifting to intersupply chain competition. Coordinated contracts can mitigate double marginal effects and improve the system's performance, and therefore, they have attracted a great deal of research attention [28]. The concept of supply chain coordination was first introduced by Pasternack (1985) [29].…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Flexible Cap-and-Trade Policy and Limited Demand Information Effects on a Sustainable Supply Chain

Gao¹

2021

Sustainability

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Carbon emission reduction is increasingly becoming a public consensus, with governments formulating carbon emission policies, enterprises investing in emission abatement equipment, and consumers having a low-carbon preference. On the other hand, it is difficult for industry managers to obtain all the demand information. Based on this, this paper aims to investigate operations and coordination for a sustainable system with a flexible cap-and-trade policy and limited demand information. Newsvendor and distribution-free newsvendor models are formulated to show the validity of limited information. Stackelberg game is exploited to derive optimal abatement and order quantity solutions under centralized and decentralized systems. The revenue-sharing and two-part tariff contracts are then proposed to coordinate the decentralized system with limited demand information. Numerical analyses complement the theoretical results. We list some major findings. Firstly, we discover that using abatement equipment can effectively reduce emissions and increase profits. Secondly, the distribution-free approach is effective and acceptable for a system where only mean and variance information is informed. Thirdly, the mean parameter has a greater impact on profits and emissions comparing with the other seven parameters. Finally, we show that both contracts may achieve perfect coordination, and the two-part tariff contract is more robust.

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Coordination contract design for the newsvendor model

Cited by 16 publications

References 18 publications

Channel Contract Coordination for Supply Chain With Behavior Preferences Under Uncertainties

Channel Contract Coordination for Supply Chain With Behavior Preferences Under Uncertainties

Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty

A Flexible Cap-and-Trade Policy and Limited Demand Information Effects on a Sustainable Supply Chain

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