Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty

Ji, Chunyi; Liu, Xiangxiang

doi:10.1051/ro/2021186

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Huang et al [21] developed a win-win contract based on a revenue sharing and price markdown and studied how vendors and retailers share their risks and benefits under stochastic demand during the pandemic. Ji and Liu [22] studied how the two-part tariff and ZRS contract (zero wholesale price-revenue-sharing-plus-side-payment contract) affect risks and supply chain coordination when market demand and supplier yield are both uncertain. Zhang et al examined partial demand information sharing from three sharing methods (neither, one, or both of the manufacturers) in a supply chain consisting of a single retailer and two competitive manufacturers.…”

Section: Demand Uncertainty In Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain under Blockchain and Uncertain Demand

Yang

Bian³

2023

Processes

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Remanufacturing has been regarded as a key to the sustainable development of enterprises. However, collection strategies affect the remanufacturing and recycling of used products. Blockchain can ensure the authenticity of disclosed information and improve the consumer’s trust in remanufactured products. Inspired by this, this paper develops a game-theoretic model to examine the selection of different recycling strategies in the remanufacturing supply chain considering blockchain adoption and uncertain demand. Incumbent collector 1 provides the manufacturer with used product 1 for remanufacturing product 1. For product 2, the manufacturer has two different collection strategies: in-house collection by the manufacturer or external collection by collector 2. The collectors act as the channel leader, and the manufacturer, who has private demand information, is the follower. Results show that collectors are incentivized to participate in the blockchain. If there is no blockchain, collector 1 prefers external collection. In the case of blockchain, the manufacturer prefers external collection when the demand variance is low. The manufacturer’s decision on the in-house collection and external collection depends on the coefficient of collection investment costs.

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Section: Demand Uncertainty In Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain under Blockchain and Uncertain Demand

Yang

Bian³

2023

Processes

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“…Our study covers many studies on promotions [2, 7, 10, 13, 16-18, 20, 21, 27], promotional period [29]. From the perspective of promotion methods, including rebate promotion [16], price discounts [1,2,12,13,21,22,25], gift card promotion [12,13], and freebie promotion [7,10,17,21], our work is mainly related to the last type of promotion. The studies related to promotion can be divided into two categories.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The studies related to promotion can be divided into two categories. The first category can be explored via experiments to investigate the following influence factors: promotion type and strategies [10,21], consumers' response to gift promotions [8,18], and consumers' preference for freebie promotional packages (buying the product and obtaining a different free item) [17].…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…To increase profits, the manufacturers and retailers in e-commerce platforms (e.g., Taobao. com and JD.com) or offline physical retail stores have adopted different sales promotional strategies [2, 7, 10, 13, 16-18, 20, 21, 27, 29], including price discounts [1,2,12,13,21,22,25], rebate [16], and freebies (i.e., offered freebies with a certain market value along with the product) [7,10,17,21]. The duration and promotional efforts of sales promotions vary.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Price decisions of freebie promotion with retailer information sharing

Yan

Hou

2022

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This study investigates two-echelon pricing game models in which a manufacturer provides freebies during a promotional period and a retailer considers whether to share private demand information with the manufacturer. In particular, the manufacturer produces products (e.g., high-end cosmetics) and sells them wholesale to the retailer during the regular selling period. During the promotional period, the manufacturer offers freebies as a means of gaining more profits. First, we investigate four pricing game models by considering the manufacturer’s and retailer’s different power structures under the condition that the manufacturer provides freebies. Then, numerical examples are used to comparatively analyze the equilibria in the different models. The results offer valuable managerial insights by performing a sensitivity analysis of three parameters, which are the relative length of the promotional period and a sensitivity coefficient and cost coefficient of the freebies.

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“…To encourage effective cooperation between both parties, they designed a combined contract of 'two-way cost sharing and benefit compensation' to coordinate the supply chain and achieve common development. Ji and Liu [40] studied a three-stage supply chain with perishable production and short shelf life under uncertain yield and demand and used ZRS (zero wholesale price and revenue-sharing-plus-side payment) contract to coordinate the supply chain.…”

Section: The Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of Perishable Product Supply Chains with a Joint Contract under Yield and Demand Uncertainty

Chen¹,

Liu

2022

Sustainability

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With the complex and changeable environment, the demand and yield in the perishable products supply chain are usually uncertain. This paper studies a joint contract that combines revenue sharing with quantity discount to coordinate the supply chain under demand and yield uncertainty, which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer pays the manufacturer a down payment at the beginning, and the manufacturer gives the retailer a quantity discount and shares a proportion of profit from the retailer at last. To make sure that both members in the supply chain want to adopt this contract, we prove the feasibility of the joint contract achieving a win–win situation. In addition, we investigate how the price in the secondary market influence the contract, and the conclusion further proves that supply chain coordination is actually a process of re-sharing risks among all nodes of the supply chain. However, the joint contract in this paper has certain adaptability to such risks. Finally, numerical analysis is given to show the impacts of uncertainties on the profit of the supply chain, the decisions made by the members, and the effectiveness of our joint contract.

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Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty

Cited by 7 publications

References 37 publications

Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain under Blockchain and Uncertain Demand

Recycling Strategies in a Collector-Led Remanufacturing Supply Chain under Blockchain and Uncertain Demand

Price decisions of freebie promotion with retailer information sharing

Coordination of Perishable Product Supply Chains with a Joint Contract under Yield and Demand Uncertainty

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