Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy When Investor Protection Is Weak

Abdel-Halim, Morad; Bino, Adel

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2416432

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Furthermore, Abdel-Halim and Bino [4] conducted research by investigating the relationship between corporate dividend policy and corporate governance mechanisms in Jordanian companies. The corporate governance mechanism is measured by the company's ownership structure.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This research was conducted in a developing market with a weak corporate governance system and ineffective law enforcement. Abdel-Halim and Bino [4] examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in countries with weak legal protection from outside investors and high concentration of ownership using two dividend agency models developed by La Porta et al, [2]. The results showed that ownership concentration was significantly negatively related to the dividend payout ratio after controlling for major confounding factors including: firm performance, size, sales growth, and leverage.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this case, by paying dividends the company has tried to fulfill its obligations to the company's shareholders so as to escalate the value of the company's shareholders. According to Abdel.-Halim and Bino [4] dividend policy is defined as a decision on the distribution of the company's net profit between dividends to shareholders and retained earnings. Furthermore, La Porta et al [2] revealed that there are two views regarding dividends, namely first, dividends as a result of the legal auspices of shareholders.…”

Section: Dividend Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Corporate governance is an important part that should exist in a company. Corporate governance is related to the supervisory mechanism carried out by stakeholders in the company against internal parties and company management so that their interests are protected [4]. Efficiency of corporate governance in the company will provide supervision, check and balance between the interests of shareholders and company management so that it can be a mechanism that reduces agency conflicts.…”

Section: Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Literature Review: Dividend Policy, Agency Theory and Corporate Governance

Handayani¹,

Widianti²,

Sulistyawati³

et al. 2022

Proceedings of the Tegal International Conference on Applied Social Science &Amp; Humanities (TICASSH 2022)

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This article surveys three theories, about the share of company profit or profits that are distributed to shareholders, agency theory, and governance of a company also includes the relationship between the stakeholders involved and the objectives of the company's management. Dividend policy is still an important issue that leads to agency conflicts. The payment of dividends is a form of agency conflict among the majority and the minority shareholders. In the meantime, the corporate governance mechanism can be a supervisory mechanism that will reduce agency conflicts. The results of this review explain that the yield model and replacement model need to be redeveloped with dividend policy, corporate governance characteristics and legal protection of investors with the result that varied and strong empirical evidence can be obtained.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Dividend Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Literature Review: Dividend Policy, Agency Theory and Corporate Governance

Handayani¹,

Widianti²,

Sulistyawati³

et al. 2022

Proceedings of the Tegal International Conference on Applied Social Science &Amp; Humanities (TICASSH 2022)

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Ownership concentration and investment sensitivity to market valuation

Tayem¹

2015

COC

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During the past decade, Jordan has undertaken substantial reforms aiming at restructuring its stock market in order to strengthen its role in promoting investment and allocating capital efficiently. This paper empirically investigates the impact of stock market development on capital investment at the firm level by assessing the investment-q sensitivity. In addition, this paper examines the impact of concentrated ownership, a salient institutional feature of listed Jordanian companies, on the investment-q sensitivity. The findings of this study indicate that investments by Jordanian firms respond significantly and positively to market signals. Furthermore, the results show that a company responds more efficiently to market signals as ownership concentration increases, which suggests that large ownership stakes align the interests of large shareholders with those of the firm.

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Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy When Investor Protection Is Weak

Cited by 2 publications

References 6 publications

Literature Review: Dividend Policy, Agency Theory and Corporate Governance

Literature Review: Dividend Policy, Agency Theory and Corporate Governance

Ownership concentration and investment sensitivity to market valuation

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