Corporate governance and strategic information on the internet

Abstract

Purpose -The purpose of this study is twofold: to evidence the disclosure practices of Spanish companies in relation to a voluntary typology of strategic information; and to determine the factors that explain these practices. Among the factors considered, the study seeks to focus on the role of the Board of Directors in depth. According to Agency Theory, strategic information has positive consequences on external funds costs. On the other hand, Proprietary Costs theory limits these practices, given that they can lead to competitive disadvantages. Design/methodology/approach -First, online strategic information disclosure practices are analysed by examining non-financial quoted Spanish firms. A disclosure index is created, and subsequently, certain factors related to corporate governance -Activity, Size and Board Independence -as well as other factors traditionally analysed, are used to explain the volume of strategic information disclosed on the internet. Findings -The results indicate that Spanish companies, on average, give out little strategic information, mainly related to objectives, their mission, and the company's philosophy. "Company annual planning" and "Information on risks" are scarcely disclosed. The findings also emphasise that companies where the Chairperson of the Board is the same person as the CEO and, moreover, in which there is a lower frequency of meetings, disclose a greater amount of strategic information on their web sites. Practical implications -The findings suggest that the disclosure of strategic information is a decision taken by executives with the aim of satisfying the demands of creditors and investors. The Board of Directors represents the shareholders' interests, but it does not participate in strategic decision-making disclosure, maybe due to the fact that the proprietary costs lack influence. Originality/value -The link between corporate governance and strategic information disclosed online has scarcely been analysed in previous literature. This study provides interesting insights into how several Board characteristics can affect the disclosure of strategic information on the internet.

The voluntary disclosure of sustainable information: a comparative analysis of spanish and brazilian companies

“…Size was selected because previous studies (Trotman and Bradley, 1981;Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989;Patten, 1991;Deegan and Gordon, 1996;Hackston and Milne, 1996;Gray et al, 2001;Archel and Lizarraga, 2001;García-Sánchez et al, 2011) have detected a direct positive relationship with firm size. The largest companies 1…”

Corporate governance mechanisms and intellectual capital

“…Spain offers an interesting framework for studying the effectiveness of the mechanisms Francisca Tejedo-Romero / Joaquim Filipe Ferraz Esteves Araujo / Magnus Luiz Emmendoerfer of good governance in the disclosure of IC information, for several reasons: a) the legal protection of shareholders there is lower than in Anglo-Saxon markets (Gisbert & Navallas, 2013), mainly of minority shareholders (PuchetaMartínez, 2015); b) Spanish capital markets are less developed than the United States', GreatBritain's and even Asian countries' markets (Fernández-Méndez & Arrondo-García, 2007;Pucheta-Martínez, 2015); c) the requirement for all listed companies, through Law 26/2003 of July 17, of having a website to provide relevant information and prepare a corporate governance report (Gisbert & Navallas, 2013;Tejedo-Romero & Araujo, 2016); d) the relevant role that the Board of Directors (henceforth BD) acquires in unitary or monist government systems (onetier-system), as it is in charge of the control and supervision of the company's management team, promoting active participation in strategic decision-making (Acero Fraile, & Alcalde Fradejas, 2010;García-Sánchez, Rodríguez Dominguez, & Gallego Álvarez, 2011); and e) the existence of a highly concentrated ownership structure (García Osma & Gill de Albornoz, 2007;Gisbert & Navallas, 2013), in which institutional directors have a significant influence on Spanish BDs (Pucheta-Martínez & García-Meca, 2014); because in Spain, in addition to executive or internal directors (insider), who hold a managerial position in the company and are directly involved in management, non-executive or outsider directors are considered as: Institutional Directors, which represent the interests of shareholder groups capable of influencing the control of the company (majority shareholders); independent directors, who are not connected either to the management team or to the control groups, but are selected for their high professional training and are responsible for ensuring the interests of minority shareholders; and other outsider directors (Law 31/2014, article 529). T h i s p a p e r a i m s t o i d e n t i f y t h e characteristics of Spanish Ibex35 companies' CG that affect the policy of IC disclosure.…”

Evidenciação De Informações Estratégicas E a Volatilidade Das Ações

“…Resultado que corrobora Sanchez et al (2011) ao dizerem que a divulgação das informações estratégicas estão se tornando mais frequentes. Para Ball (2001), o acréscimo de informações torna os relatórios contábeis mais relevantes, gerando benefícios aos investidores e demais usuários.…”