Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective

Abstract

Instead of traditional principal-agent conflicts espoused in most research dealing with developed economies, principal-principal conflicts have been identified as a major concern of corporate governance in emerging economies. Principal-principal conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal protection of minority shareholders. Such principal-principal conflicts alter the dynamics of the corporate governance process and, in turn, require remedies different from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts. This article reviews and synthesizes recent research from strategy, finance, and economics on principal-principal conflicts with an emphasis on their institutional antecedents and organizational consequences. The resulting integration provides a foundation upon which future research can continue to build. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008.

Effects of Path Dependence on Capabilities in Captive Global Value Chains

“…World economic changes and institutional changes in several countries such as Brazil and China, as well as access to resources have reconfigured the trajectory of this GVC and the advantages linked to certain locations. Scholars agree that changes in the institutional environment affect governance in GVCs (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013;Paiva & Vieira, 2011;Young et al, 2008). Furthermore, the path dependence perspective can explain some of these changes or why other changes did not happen.…”

“…For instance, changes in institutional environments and economic growth in developing and emerging countries have provided a dynamic perspective on how supply chains are configured to add value (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013;Paiva & Vieira, 2011;Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Gereffi et al (2005) noted three main dimensions that play important roles in the GVC dynamic: the complexity of transactions, the ability to codify transactions, and the capabilities of the supply base.…”

Efeitos Da Vinculação De Conselheiros Ao Acordo De Acionistas No Valor Da Firma

“…Esse acionista, com uma fração substancial da propriedade e controle, teria incentivo, para suportar os custos econômicos do monitoramento, e poder, para disciplinar os administradores. Por outro lado, uma alta concentração de propriedade (e controle) nas mãos de um único acionista (ou um pequeno grupo de acionistas) leva a outro problema: o conflito de interesses entre acionistas minoritários e majoritários é mais pronunciado (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005;Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).…”

Immigrants from Asia: Are they better for a More Ethical Business Environment?

“…Unexpectedly, the Asian immigrants who work in these kind of countries tend to stick to their culture and groups more. Because it is also possible to see the existence of weak legal protection of the immigrants in the business life of these countries [14], and if the employees stand alone, they would not protect themselves easily. Table 2 shows the allocation of the primary answers to the questions.…”