Corporate Homicide: Definitional Processes in the Creation of Deviance

Abstract

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“It’s a Horrible Coincidence”: Corporate Responsibility and the 2007 Pet Food Recall

“…Several case studies of news media depictions of corporate crime have been conducted (e.g., Burns and Orrick 2003;Caveder and Mulcahy 1998;Evans and Lundman 1983;Goff 2001;Lofquist 1997;Lynch et al 1989;McMullan 2006;McMullan and McClung 2006;Morash and Hale 1987;Slingerland et al 2006;Swigert andFarrell (1980-1981;Wright et al 1995), and space constraints preclude an exhaustive review of them here. What follows is therefore an overview of the major findings of the studies most relevant to examining the PFR.…”

“…In one of the earliest case studies, Swigert andFarrell (1980-1981) examined the media coverage of the corporate violence perpetrated by Ford Motor Company in the form of its Pinto model. One of the important findings of their study, highlighted by others (e.g., Slingerland et al 2006;Wright et al 1995), is that the media construction of the event and Ford's culpability shifted over time: Early on the problem with the Pinto was depicted as mechanical, but reports shifted to suggest that Ford had been aware of the problems and bore some responsibility.…”

Lady Justice and the Corporate Visor: An Application of Routine Activity Theory as a Synthesized Theoretical Framework for Explaining Corporate Crime

“…Conklin (1977) identifies just some of the potential suitable targets for white collar and corporate crime when he states that, "most business crimes involve an obvious victim: a defrauded stock-holder, a deceived customer, or a company which has lost money through employee theft" (p.4). However, historically the major victim of corporate crime has been the federal government and thus, indirectly the In this regard, as Swigert and Farrell (1981) point out, one must understand that the parameters of the law are both statutory and culturally implicit. Specifically, they argue that while, "there are no statutory exemptions from criminal responsibility accorded those whose damages to human life occur within the context of the manufacture and sale of consumables.. .rather, they (corporate actors) have enjoyed a de facto exemption which has become institutionalized in the law" (p. 163).…”

“…In other words, due to the loose regulatory structure that fostered the development of modern corporate actors there is a general laissez faire attitude concerning the standardized application of regulatory laws against corporations even when the actions of those corporations clearly fall within the jurisdiction of apropos statutes. As an example Swigert and Farrell (1981) compare a fatal argument between two drunken friends with corporate culpability in actions resulting in the deaths of individuals. "Fatal bodily harm, however, may just as easily be a product of dangerous factory conditions, polluted air, or unsafe motor vehicles as it is of bullet wounds, knifings, or beatings" (Swigert and Farrell, 1981, p. 163).…”

“…In addition to the loose application of regulatory law to corporate actors, the culturally implicit nature of the law referred to by Swigert and Farrell (1981) deals with the aforementioned lack of a widespread public connection between corporate deviance and actual law violations. Although many would argue that this public paradigm is less a reality today than it was in Sutherland's day, the cold hard truth remains that only the most heinous and publicly celebrated cases of corporate deviance ever reach a criminal courtroom.…”