Correlated Anarchy in Overlapping Wireless Networks

Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Moustakas, Aris L.

doi:10.1109/jsac.2008.080913

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Up to the knowledge of the authors, the state of art of the BS sharing and BS selection scenarios is described by the following contributions: [10], [4], [5], [8]. In [10], the BS selection problem is investigated by considering that each node is characterized by a fixed single user spectral efficiency. Here, the authors showed that based on the scheme of exponential learning, players converge to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Base Station Selection and Base Station Sharing in Self-Configuring Networks

Perlaza¹,

Belmega²,

Lasaulce³

et al. 2009

Proceedings of the 4th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

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We model the interaction of several radio devices aiming to obtain wireless connectivity by using a set of base stations (BS) as a non-cooperative game. Each radio device aims to maximize its own spectral efficiency (SE) in two different scenarios: First, we let each player to use a unique BS (BS selection) and second, we let them to simultaneously use several BSs (BS Sharing). In both cases, we show that the resulting game is an exact potential game. We found that the BS selection game posses multiple Nash equilibria (NE) while the BS sharing game posses a unique one. We provide fully decentralized algorithms which always converge to a NE in both games. We analyze the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the case of BS selection. Finally, we observed that depending on the number of transmitters, the BS selection technique might provide a better global performance (network spectral efficiency) than BS sharing, which suggests the existence of a Braess type paradox.

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confidence: 99%

On the Base Station Selection and Base Station Sharing in Self-Configuring Networks

Perlaza¹,

Belmega²,

Lasaulce³

et al. 2009

Proceedings of the 4th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

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“…x is decreasing for x > 1 + γ * that there is always only one such y. 31 To prove part 2) first note that the maximum utility that can be obtained in this game is bounded…”

Section: F Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 97%

On the Two-User Multi-Carrier Joint Channel Selection and Power Control Game

Haddad¹,

Więcek²,

Habachi³

et al. 2016

IEEE Trans. Commun.

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In this paper, we propose a hierarchical game approach to model the energy efficiency maximization problem where transmitters individually choose their channel assignment and power control. We conduct a thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium.Interestingly, we formally show that a spectrum orthogonalization naturally occurs when users decide sequentially about their transmitting carriers and powers, delivering a binary channel assignment. Both analytical and simulation results are provided for assessing and improving the performances in terms of energy efficiency and spectrum utilization between the simultaneous-move game (with synchronous decision makers), the social welfare (in a centralized manner) and the proposed Stackelberg (hierarchical) game. For the first time, we provide tight closed-form bounds on the spectral efficiency of such a model, including correlation across carriers and users. We show that the spectrum orthogonalization capability induced by the proposed hierarchical game model enables the wireless network to achieve the spectral efficiency improvement while still enjoying a high energy efficiency.

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“…The channel state of knowledge window or the stationary time of the environment needs to be at least greater than the convergence time of the algorithms. Due to the very complex nature of the problem, new tools and a thinking of new sort need to be developed taking into account evolution and learning aspects [41]- [42].Moreover, instead of looking at how equilibria (which in any case will happen only for a short period of time) can be maintained, one should better focus on tools to understand how new equilibria states emerge from nonequilibrium situations.…”

Section: Iv-f the Dynamics Foundationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theoretical Foundations of Mobile Flexible Networks

Debbah

2011

REV-JEC

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The general framework of Mobile Flexible Networks (MFN) is to design dense self-organizing, self-healing and self-energy harvesting secure networks where terminals and base stations interact and self-adapt in an intelligent manner without the need of a central controller or with the right amount of regulation to let the agents in the network exploit fully the degrees of freedom. The design depends mainly on the mobility pattern as in highly mobile environments, intelligence at the terminal reduces the cost of signalling whereas for fixed (non-mobile) networks, all the intelligence can be put on the network side. One of the big challenges is to find how to optimally split the intelligence between cognitive terminals and cognitive networks. In this paper, we discuss the challenges ahead and provide some research directions to develop the theoretical foundations of these networks 1 .

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Correlated Anarchy in Overlapping Wireless Networks

Cited by 14 publications

References 36 publications

On the Base Station Selection and Base Station Sharing in Self-Configuring Networks

On the Base Station Selection and Base Station Sharing in Self-Configuring Networks

On the Two-User Multi-Carrier Joint Channel Selection and Power Control Game

Theoretical Foundations of Mobile Flexible Networks

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