2013
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8640
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Cost-Optimal Planning by Self-Interested Agents

Abstract: As our world becomes better connected and autonomous agents no longer appear to be science fiction, a natural need arises for enabling groups of selfish agents to cooperate in generating plans for diverse tasks that none of them can perform alone in a cost-effective manner. While most work on planning for/by selfish agents revolves around finding stable solutions (e.g., Nash Equilibrium), this work combines techniques from mechanism design with a recently introduced method for distributed planning, in order to… Show more

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Cited by 20 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Cost-optimized planning allows for planning problems to be constructed which account for some action cost; behaviors which can be selected by the agent are associated with some value, and the cumulative value of a plan is maximized or minimized to select the best option. Approaches for assigning the action cost vary widely, with approaches ranging from assigning the action cost based on action time-to-perform [31,32], human-specified costs [33], deviance from human expectation [34], social norms [35], social welfare maximization [36], energy cost [37], and many more beyond our scope.…”
Section: Action Selection With Human Interactionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cost-optimized planning allows for planning problems to be constructed which account for some action cost; behaviors which can be selected by the agent are associated with some value, and the cumulative value of a plan is maximized or minimized to select the best option. Approaches for assigning the action cost vary widely, with approaches ranging from assigning the action cost based on action time-to-perform [31,32], human-specified costs [33], deviance from human expectation [34], social norms [35], social welfare maximization [36], energy cost [37], and many more beyond our scope.…”
Section: Action Selection With Human Interactionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this work, we consider a distributed form of collaborative multi-agent planning where agents cooperate with one another while keeping various information private. MA-STRIPS (Brafman and Domshlak 2013) is one of the most basic formalisms for this type of privacy-preserving multi-agent planning (or privacypreserving planning for short), and several planning techniques have since been proposed to solve respective tasks (Nissim and Brafman 2013;Torreño, Onaindia, and Sapena 2014). The recent emergence of a dedicated competition on distributed and multi-agent planning (CoDMAP) ( Štolba, Komenda, and Kovacs 2015) emphasizes the raising interest in this field.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Game-theoretic approaches that evaluate every strategy of every agent against all other strategies are ineffective for planning, since even if plan length is bounded polynomially, the number of available strategies is exponential (Nissim and Brafman 2013). However, in environments where cooperation is not allowed or calculating an initial joint plan is not possible, game-theoretic approaches are useful.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%