Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970–1998

Abstract

Counterterrorism strategies involving the killing of terrorists are a prominently used but controversial practice. Proponents argue that such strategies are useful tools for reducing terrorist activity, while critics question their effectiveness. This paper provides empirical insight into this strategy by conducting a series of negative binomial regression and Tobit estimations of the impact of killing Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) terrorists as well as members of the Catholic community on counts of PIRA bombings and targeting activity in Northern Ireland for the period 1970-1998. We consider the impact of discriminate and indiscriminate killings (where only PIRA militants are killed versus those in which both militants and civilians are also killed) on subsequent PIRA IED attacks. Our findings illustrate that while total and discriminate counterterrorism killings have little to no effect on PIRA IED attacks, indiscriminate counterterrorism killings increased PIRA bombings overall and prompted the Provisional IRA to specifically target civilians in IED events. We conclude by discussing the scholarly and policy implications of these findings.

Lasting peace or temporary calm? Rebel group decapitation and civil war outcomes

“…Popular support is also the primary path through which groups may find themselves stronger after their leader has been removed; however, this is expected to be relatively uncommon. A number of studies argue that groups may retaliate against their foe following targeted killings (Gill et al, 2016; Jordan, 2009; Mannes, 2008), such as Hezbollah’s increase of suicide attacks on Israel following attacks on its leaders in the 1980s (Byman, 2006). An increase in attacks does not necessarily denote an increase in military capacity, however.…”

Assessing the Nuances of Counterterrorism Programs: A Country-Level Investigation of Targeted Killings

“…Specifically, Zussman and Zussman (2006) determined that the success of the program was contingent on whether military or political leaders were killed. Research both within and outside of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, such as with the examinations of targeted killings in Northern Ireland (Gill et al, 2016), has found that if killings are perceived to be especially indiscriminate the strategy can backfire. Work on the insurgency–counterinsurgency relationship (Condra & Shapiro, 2012; Fielding & Shortland, 2010; Linke et al, 2012) has yielded similar complexities, while the leadership decapitation literature has produced results consistent with both success (Johnston, 2012; Price, 2012) and failure (Abrahms & Mierau, 2017; D’Alessio et al, 2014; Mannes, 2008).…”

“…Previous quantitative evaluations have produced mixed results regarding the influence of this tactic on a variety of outcomes. Studies within the contexts of Northern Ireland (Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer, & Horgan, 2015; Gill, Piazza, & Horgan, 2016), the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Benmelech, Berrebi, & Klor, 2015; Hafez & Hatfield, 2006; Zussman & Zussman, 2006), and counterinsurgency (Condra & Shapiro, 2012; Fielding & Shortland, 2010; Linke, Witmer, & O’Loughlin, 2012) have yielded evidence on both sides. Related work on leadership decapitation, or the removal of high-level members, is similarly complex (Abrahms & Mierau, 2017; D’Alessio, Stolzenberg, & Dariano, 2014; Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2009; Mannes, 2008; Price, 2012), as are the recent contributions that directly examine the U.S.’s use of this strategy (Carson, 2017; Hepworth, 2014; Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016; Wilner, 2010).…”

The transformation of targeted killing and international order

“…A number of scholars have argued that targeted-killing or decapitation strikes are effective in the sense that they undermine the operational capabilities and resolve of enemy agents (Byman, 2006 ; Johnston, 2012 ; Price, 2012 ; Tiernay, 2015 ) or, at least, the moral within the attacking country (Wey, 2015 ). This argument of strategic effectiveness has been challenged by scholars who argue that the targeted killing of state (Hosmer, 2001 ; Pape, 1996 ) and non-state agents (Gill, Piazza, & Horgan, 2016 ; Hafez & Hatfield, 2006 ; Jordan, 2009 , 2014 ; Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal, & Samban, 2005 ) has no effects or even negative effects such as increasing enemy resolve or inciting retributive attacks (see also Carvin, 2012 , and, more recently, Abrahams & Mierau, 2015 ; Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016 ; Lehrke & Schomaker, 2016 ; Morehouse, 2015 ). While these studies address the effectiveness of targeted killing in armed conflict, Bob and Erikson Nepstad ( 2007 ) analyze factors that influence the effects of killing leaders in social movements.…”