Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited

Stasavage, David

doi:10.1093/jleo/18.1.155

Cited by 189 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Previous scholarship in political science and economics focuses on how the structure of political institutions generates credible policy commitments (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, North and Weingast, 1989, Stasavage, 2002. For example, scholars believe democratic political institutions render commitments to protect property rights and contract enforcement credible because democratization, among other things, is a process that places constraints on the chief executive and encourages oversight by the electorate (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, (2005).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Private investment thrives when countries commit to property rights, contract enforcement, and equitable protection for all citizens under the law (Barro and Gordon 1983, North and Weingast 1989, Mauro 1995, Stasavage 2002, Frye 2004. Whether the rule of law exists in a country influences economic development because the costs and risks of doing business depend on whether property rights are protected and contracts are enforced.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trapping the tigers: Regulation of market entry and the rule of law in SE Asia

Touchton

2015

The Social Science Journal

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trapping the tigers: Regulation of market entry and the rule of law in SE Asia

Touchton

2015

The Social Science Journal

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“…5 There is a large literature on England's Financial Revolution (see Dickson, 1967;Tomlinson, 1979;North and Weingast, 1989;Rosevere, 1991;Hart, 1991;Carruthers, 1996;Quinn, 2001;Stasavage, 2002;Sussman and Yafeh, 2006). In linking the Financial Revolution to the Industrial Revolution that followed a century later we are implicitly following North and Weingast (1989) and Pincus and Robinson (2011).…”

Section: French and English Tax Systems In 1500mentioning

confidence: 99%

Standardizing the Fiscal State: Cabal Tax Farming as an Intermediate Institution in Early-Modern England and France

Johnson

Koyama

2012

SSRN Journal

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How did modern and centralized fiscal institutions emerge? We develop a model that explains (i) why pre-industrial states relied on private individuals to collect taxes; (ii) why after 1600 both England and France moved from competitive methods for collecting revenues to allocating the right to collect taxes to a small group of financiers-a intermediate institution that we call cabal tax farming--and (iii) why this centralization led to investments in fiscal capacity and increased fiscal standardization. We provide detailed historical evidence that supports our prediction that rulers abandoned the competitive allocation of tax rights in favor of cabal tax farming in order to gain access to inside credit and that this transition was accompanied by investments in standardization. Finally (iv) we show why this intermediate institution proved to be self-undermining in England where it was quickly replaced by direct collection, but lasted in France until the French Revolution.

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“…O trabalho de Stasavage (2002) reforça as críticas. Esse autor alega que, apesar de ser possível atingir um comprometimento crível através da limitação das prerrogativas do governo central, é preciso considerar que a barganha entre atores políticos, em suas múltiplas dimensões, pode levar a resultados diferentes quando aplicada a outros contextos.…”

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“…Esse autor alega que, apesar de ser possível atingir um comprometimento crível através da limitação das prerrogativas do governo central, é preciso considerar que a barganha entre atores políticos, em suas múltiplas dimensões, pode levar a resultados diferentes quando aplicada a outros contextos. De acordo com Stasavage (2002), o comprometimento pode estar mais relacionado à emergência de um novo ciclo político, resultante de mudanças na distribuição de poder dentro do Parlamento, do que ao impacto da limitação do governo através da descentralização de responsabilidades.…”

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O NEXO FEDERAL: a relação entre sistemas partidários e políticas públicas no Brasil e na Argentina

Simpson

2017

Cad. CRH

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O trabalho ressalta o papel do sistema de partidos no Brasil e na Argentina como elemento central para a compreensão da capacidade de coordenação das relações intergovernamentais (RIGs) e, consequentemente, para a implementação de políticas públicas nacionais. O argumento central é que os níveis de conflitividade das RIGs, ao longo da história, são modelados pelo sistema partidário, com implicações diretas nas políticas públicas. A hipótese é que uma maior nacionalização do sistema partidário resulta em RIGs mais cooperativas, e, consequentemente, maior capacidade de penetração territorial do estado central, com políticas públicas intertemporais. Conclui-se que a dinâmica das RIGs, nos países em questão, alcança resultados contrários: enquanto, na Argentina, parece incentivar uma maior territorializaçao partidária, no Brasil, encaminha-se para a construção de um marco de interação mais cooperativo.

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Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited

Cited by 189 publications

References 43 publications

Trapping the tigers: Regulation of market entry and the rule of law in SE Asia

Trapping the tigers: Regulation of market entry and the rule of law in SE Asia

Standardizing the Fiscal State: Cabal Tax Farming as an Intermediate Institution in Early-Modern England and France

O NEXO FEDERAL: a relação entre sistemas partidários e políticas públicas no Brasil e na Argentina

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