Macroprudential tools have been used around the world as a mechanism to control potential risks and imbalances in the nancial sector. Colombia is a good example of a country that has employed dierent regulatory measures to manage systemic risks in the economy. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the eectiveness of two policies employed in said country to increase the resilience of the system and to moderate exuberance in credit supply. The rst measure, the countercyclical reserve requirement, was implemented in 2007 to control excessive credit growth. The second tool corresponds to the dynamic provisioning scheme for commercial loans, whose objective was to consolidate a countercyclical buer through loan loss provision requirements. To perform this analysis a rich data set based on loan-by-loan information for Colombian banks during the period between 2006 and 2009 is used. A xed eects panel model is estimated using debtors', banks' and macroeconomic characteristics as control variables. In addition, a dierence in dierences estimation is performed to evaluate the impact of the aforementioned policies. Findings suggest that dynamic provisions and the countercyclical reserve requirement had a negative eect on credit growth, and that said eect diers conditioned on bank-specic characteristics. Results also suggest that the aggregate macroprudential policy stance in Colombia has worked as an eective stabilizer of credit cycles, with some preliminary evidence also pointing towards signicant eects in reducing bank risktaking. Moreover, evidence is found that macroprudential policies have worked as a complement of monetary policy, accompanying the stabilizing eects of changes in interest rates on credit growth. JEL classication: E58, G28, C23 from the Bank of Mexico for their valuable comments on a preliminary version of this paper. We would also like to thank the participants of the LACEA meeting in Santa Cruz and Banco de la Republica's research seminar for their comments.The opinions contained herein are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reect those of Banco de la República or its Board of Governors. All errors and omissions remain our own.Director,