Cursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and Economic Growth

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Since Sachs and Warner's (1995a) contribution, there has been a lively debate on the so-called natural resource curse. This paper re-examines the effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth using new measures of resource endowment and considering the role of institutional quality. We find a positive direct empirical relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth. In both OLS and 2SLS regressions, the positive resource effects are particularly strong for subsoil wealth. Our results also show no evidence of negative indirect effects of natural resources through the institutional channel. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources

“…9 Unfortunately, we could not use the natural resource wealth indicators proposed by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and Brunnschweiler (2008) as the data is not available over time. However, we are most interested in the impact of rents that arise from natural resources on governance and less so on the impact of the existence of natural wealth.…”

Measuring world governance: revisiting the institutions hypothesis

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