Dancing on the Slippery Slope: The Effects of Appropriate Versus Inappropriate Competitive Tactics on Negotiation Process and Outcome

Fleck, Denise; Volkema, Roger J.; Pereira, Sérgio Luiz

doi:10.1007/s10726-016-9469-7

Cited by 8 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 77 publications

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“…The latter examples have been categorized as 'traditional competitive bargaining ' (Robinson et al 2000). Based on previous findings (Cohen et al 2014;Fleck et al 2016;Lewicki et al 2015), we define unethical negotiation tactics as separate from competitive but ethically acceptable ones. We conceptualize making false promises, misrepresenting information, attacking the network of the opponent and gathering inappropriate information about the opponent as unethical tactics.…”

Section: Unethical Negotiation Tacticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior… representatives are willing to use unethical tactics when these are implicitly or explicitly approved by their constituency members, it is important to find out why. While competitive behavior is indeed likely to ensure individual gain, and can therefore be interpreted as good for the whole group, this is not necessarily the case for unethical behavior (Fleck et al 2016). Moreover, the risk of employing unethical rather than competitive tactics is much higher; unethical behavior can result in sanctions if one is 'caught' displaying such tactics and there are psychological costs of dishonesty in terms of self-image (Mazar et al 2008;Hilbig 2018, 2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement

2020

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While organizations strive for ethical conduct, the activity of negotiating offers strong temptations to employ unethical tactics and secure benefits for one’s own party. In four experiments, we examined the role of constituency communication in terms of their attitudes towards (un)ethical and competitive conduct on negotiators’ willingness and actual use of unethical tactics. We find that the mere presence of a constituency already increased representatives’ willingness to engage in unethical behavior (Experiment 1). More specifically, a constituency communicating liberal (vs. strict) attitudes toward unethical conduct helps negotiators to justify transgressions and morally disengage from their behavior, resulting in an increased use of unethical negotiation tactics (Experiment 2–3). Moreover, constituents’ endorsement of competitive strategies sufficed to increase moral disengagement and unethical behavior of representative negotiators in a similar fashion (Experiment 4ab). Our results caution organizational practice against advocating explicit unethical and even competitive tactics by constituents: it eases negotiators’ moral dilemma towards unethical conduct.

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Section: Unethical Negotiation Tacticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement

2020

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“…The offensive goal–defensive goal paradigm is not the same as “offers” and “demands” which are often found in the negotiation literature (Rubin ; Fleck, Volkema, and Pereira ): offers are the same as offensive goals (here is what I can give you), but demands (what I want from you) are not the same as defensive goals (what I do not want to give you).…”

Section: Case Data and Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 Third, in international trade, "offensive goals" consist of the text or decision that the party seeks to secure from the other side. "Defensive goals" consist of the text or decisions that the party does not want to give the other side The offensive goal-defensive goal paradigm is not the same as "offers" and "demands" which are often found in the negotiation literature (Rubin 1983;Fleck, Volkema, and Pereira 2016): offers are the same as offensive goals (here is what I can give you), but demands (what I want from you) are not the same as defensive goals (what I do not want to give you).…”

Section: Some General Observations About Precedentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Precedents in Negotiated Decisions: Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

Crump¹,

Moon²

2017

Negotiation Journal

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Initial random acts can be replicated and evolve into precedents, but precedents can also be built with strategic intent. Regardless of their origin, strategically applying a particular precedent or effectively refuting the relevance of a precedent can help a negotiator control decisions and achieve interdependent goals. The purposeful use of precedents has received little attention in the negotiation literature, even though using precedents can be a powerful negotiating tactic. In this study, we examine how past decisions became precedents that helped establish the Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2014 (KAFTA). We further consider how precedents established through KAFTA later influenced trade negotiations with Canada, China, India, and Japan. Following an extensive literature review and field research, we developed a two‐dimensional matrix (precedent ownership and negotiator goals) to help guide negotiators both offensively (what I want from you) and defensively (what I don't want to give you). We conclude by proposing research to enhance our understanding of temporal issues in negotiation. No previous study within the negotiation literature has examined precedents empirically.

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“…Research on B2B negotiations comprises an array of studies that explore negotiation behavior by sectors (e.g., Al-Khatib, Vollmers, and Liu 2007;Fleck, Volkema, and Pereira 2016;Sigurdardottir, Ujwary-Gil, and Candi 2018), by performance (e.g., Mintu-Wimsatt and Calantone 1996;Pullins et al 2000;Tellefsen 2006), within organizational teams (e.g., Smith and Barclay 1993;Tellefsen 2006); and with regard to organizational factors that influence the process (e.g., Michaels, Dubinsky, and Rich 1995;Katrichis 1998), power architecture (e.g., Balakrishnan, Patton, and Lewis 1993;Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003;Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan 2006), conflict or cooperation (e.g., Schurr and Ozanne, 1985;Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin 1993), cultural differences (e.g., Campbell et al 1988;Mintu-Wimsatt and Calantone 2000;Fang 2006), negotiation strategies (e.g., Graham et al 1988;Perdue and Summers 1991;Ganesan 1993), negotiation tactics (e.g., Alexander, Schul, and Babakus 1991;Volkema and Fleury 2002;Reid, Pullins, and Plank 2002;Sigurdardottir, Ujwary-Gil, and Candi 2018), and ethics, morals, and trust (e.g., Elahee and Brooks 2004;Al-Khatib, Vollmers, and Liu 2007).…”

Section: Business-to-business Negotiationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Buyer and Seller Differences in Business‐to‐Business Negotiations

Sigurdardottir

Hotait²,

Eichstädt

2019

Negotiation Journal

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The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to examine the differences between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics in face‐to‐face business‐to‐business (B2B) negotiations and second, to explore how negotiators' professed negotiation styles influence buyers' and sellers' use of tactics. The methodology is a multiple case study analysis of eighteen negotiators representing twelve companies in six real‐life buyer–seller negotiations in B2B settings analyzed using qualitative research methods, including both comparative analysis and frequency analysis. We found some difference between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics, which suggests this question deserves further empirical study. Buyers' and sellers' use of specific tactics differs according to which overall strategy the negotiators chose, and sellers generally use a greater number of negotiation tactics than buyers. The findings challenge previous findings that suggest that B2B negotiations are collaborative and that negotiators communicate in a collaborative manner. The findings also increase our understanding of buyers' and sellers' variable use of tactics in the course of everyday practice as well as the interplay between negotiation tactics and strategies.

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Dancing on the Slippery Slope: The Effects of Appropriate Versus Inappropriate Competitive Tactics on Negotiation Process and Outcome

Cited by 8 publications

References 77 publications

Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement

Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement

Precedents in Negotiated Decisions: Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

Buyer and Seller Differences in Business‐to‐Business Negotiations

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