Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder

Almeida, Cláudio de; Fett, João

doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1009127

Cited by 18 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…Em casos típicos de conhecimento, pode haver derrota enganadora da justificação, isto é, uma derrota ilusória da justificação, porque o efeito de aparente derrota da justificação dependerá de uma proposição falsa atuando como derrotador efetivo (KLEIN, 1981;DE ALMEIDA;FETT, 2016).…”

Section: /14unclassified

Restaurando a Explicação do Anulabilismo Falibilista sobre o Conhecimento a partir de Crença Falsa

Alves

2021

Intuitio

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O objetivo deste artigo é responder a duas objeções que podem ser feitas à explicação do anulabilismo falibilista referente à possibilidade de conhecimento inferencial originado em falsidade (KFF). A primeira objeção é que a ausência de restauradores indica a incompletude da explicação anulabilista falibilista de KFF, enquanto a segunda é que o experimento mental de KFF viola o Princípio Resistência à Verdade* (RV*) — a principal tese do anulabilismo falibilista. Na primeira seção, explicarei no que consiste o debate acerca da possibilidade de conhecimento inferencial a partir de falsidade; na segunda seção, explicarei o anulabilismo falibilista, desenvolvida por de Almeida (2017); na última seção, desenvolverei os argumentos que podem ser feitos contra o anulabilismo falibilista e explicarei por que não funcionam.

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Section: /14unclassified

Restaurando a Explicação do Anulabilismo Falibilista sobre o Conhecimento a partir de Crença Falsa

Alves

2021

Intuitio

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“…Here is an analogous case concerning normative reasons for action. 68 On DTK, see, e.g., (Levy 1978;Klein 1979;Klein 1980;Klein 1981;de Almeida and Fett, 2016). 69 Here I follow (de Almeida and Fett, 2016) 70 See (Lehrer and Paxson Jr. 1969).…”

Section: Misleading Defeatersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…68 On DTK, see, e.g., (Levy 1978;Klein 1979;Klein 1980;Klein 1981;de Almeida and Fett, 2016). 69 Here I follow (de Almeida and Fett, 2016) 70 See (Lehrer and Paxson Jr. 1969). The term "misleading defeaters" comes from (Levy 1978;Klein 1979;Klein 1980;Klein 1981).…”

Section: Misleading Defeatersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…76 Conclusion I have argued that existing versions of the Reasoning View are subject to an overlooked problem, the Overgeneration Problem, which renders the Reasoning View liable to counterexamples familiar from discussions of Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. I 74 (Klein 1980, 88) 75 For an overview, see (de Almeida and Fett, 2016). 76 One such qualification is that, plausibly, we will have to ensure that the defeater-eater (G) must not itself be a normative reason for the agent to /.…”

Section: Misleading Defeatersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning

Asarnow

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that the norms of practical reasoning, like the norms of theoretical reasoning, are characteristically defeasible, in a sense I make precise. Recognizing this property of those norms makes space for a solution to the problem. The resulting view is in a way analogous to the familiar defeasibility theory of knowledge, but it avoids a standard objection to that theory.

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“…The mere existence of a propositional defeater of S's justification for believing P hasn't the power to take this justification away from S. In spite of this, S's justification is negatively affected by the mere existence of such a defeater. According Bergmann (2006) and other epistemologists (Chisholm 1964, Lehrer and Paxson 1969, Klein 1976, Swain 1974, De Almeida and Fett 2015, in particular, the mere existence of a propositional defeater has the power to make S's justification unfit to sustain knowledge.…”

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confidence: 99%