Defeating Jamming With the Power of Silence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Abstract

The timing channel is a logical communication channel in which information is encoded in the timing between events. Recently, the use of the timing channel has been proposed as a countermeasure to reactive jamming attacks performed by an energy-constrained malicious node. In fact, whilst a jammer is able to disrupt the information contained in the attacked packets, timing information cannot be jammed and, therefore, timing channels can be exploited to deliver information to the receiver even on a jammed channel.Since the nodes under attack and the jammer have conflicting interests, their interactions can be modeled by means of game theory. Accordingly, in this paper a game-theoretic model of the interactions between nodes exploiting the timing channel to achieve resilience to jamming attacks and a jammer is derived and analyzed. More specifically, the Nash equilibrium is studied in the terms of existence, uniqueness, and convergence under best response dynamics. Furthermore, the case in which the communication nodes set their strategy and the jammer reacts accordingly is modeled and analyzed as a Stackelberg game, by considering both perfect and imperfect knowledge of the jammer's utility function. Extensive numerical results are presented, showing the impact of network parameters on the system performance.

Jammer-Type Estimation in LTE With a Smart Jammer Repeated Game

“…In [38], the user is aware of the jammer's existence and intelligence, which is in contrast with our proposed model that requires jamming sense. Also, [38] assumes that the user can compute the jammer's Best Response (BR) and fading channel gains of the opponent player are known. Our proposed model makes no such assumptions for its algorithm design and analysis.…”

“…Other game-theoretic Stackelberg formulations have also been proposed for jamming in wireless networks (cf. [38], [39]) in which the jammer can tune its transmit power, adapt attack duration and choose to save energy similar to our proposed model. However, there are many fundamental differences between these formulations and our proposed model.…”

“…However, there are many fundamental differences between these formulations and our proposed model. For example, [38] used a Stackelberg game to model a jamming defense problem in the presence of a smart jammer who can learn transmission power of the user. In [38], the user is aware of the jammer's existence and intelligence, which is in contrast with our proposed model that requires jamming sense.…”

“…For example, [38] used a Stackelberg game to model a jamming defense problem in the presence of a smart jammer who can learn transmission power of the user. In [38], the user is aware of the jammer's existence and intelligence, which is in contrast with our proposed model that requires jamming sense. Also, [38] assumes that the user can compute the jammer's Best Response (BR) and fading channel gains of the opponent player are known.…”

Antifragile Communications

“…While not meant to be antifragile, research involving the establishment of a timing channel to counter a reactive jamming attack, including [77] and [78], has similarities with the approach described in this chapter. The strategy in [77] is similar to our replace with noise jammer exploitation approach, in terms of using the presence or absence of a signal to carry information.…”