2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2016.12.001
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Defense against packet collusion attacks in opportunistic networks

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Cited by 16 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…The authors in [167], [169], [196] propose a Merkle-Hash-Tree to detect a malicious nodes which drop packet and add fake packets. It calculates root hash, and then appends it with every packets.…”
Section: Review Of Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The authors in [167], [169], [196] propose a Merkle-Hash-Tree to detect a malicious nodes which drop packet and add fake packets. It calculates root hash, and then appends it with every packets.…”
Section: Review Of Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This raises the requirement of using ML techniques to preemptively predict the attacks based on the past behavior of nodes and some statistical analysis approach, so that such attacks can be avoided. This requirement justifies our motivation in proposing a RFC-based secured routing protocol (called (RFCSec)) for OppIoT to protect against packet collusion, 9 hypernova, supernova, and wormhole attacks. 10…”
Section: Design Of the Rfcsec Protocol For Oppiotmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…When the nodes meet each other, they are required to exchange their encounter record histories, based on which other nodes can evaluate their forwarding behaviors. Alajeely et al [3] present the detection attack and trace back mechanisms based on the Merkle tree, where the legitimate nodes can detect attack based on the received packets and then trace back and identify the malicious nodes. Zhu et al [7] exploit a trusted authority (TA) to judge the forwarding behavior of nodes based on the collected delegation task evidence, forwarding history evidence, and contact history evidence.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, these routing schemes are inefficient in the DTNs environment with malicious or selfish nodes. To mitigate the impact of selfish or malicious nodes on DTNs, some detection attacks schemes are proposed in [3,6,7], which make use of the history forwarding evidences and encounter records of each node to analyze its forwarding behavior. However, these detection schemes are independent of specific routing protocols and require more computing capability, network bandwidth, and storage resources to work well.…”
Section: Security and Communication Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
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