Defense Strategy Selection Method for Stackelberg Security Game Based on Incomplete Information

Ge, Xiaoyue; Zhou, Tianyang; Zang, Yichao

doi:10.1145/3349341.3349467

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Similarities can be found in Ge et al (2019). In their paper they found that the unequal information between the attack and defence sides of the network is not taken into account in the research of network-security defence technology in the game model.…”

Section: G) Network Security Gamesmentioning

confidence: 66%

Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

Špačková

Špaček

2020

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

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Since its origins, when it was mainly connected to the field of economics, game theory has brought important theoretic insights into many domains. Besides biology, philosophy or computer science, its findings have been applied to various fields of public policy. One specific area of public policy is that of security. Within the last two decades we have been witnesses to a significant increase in efforts to model security issues using tools of game theory and to derive political implications. The paper deals with the model of a Stackelberg security game and its real-world applications in security domains. The main aim and purpose of the paper is to provide a survey of selected cases of real-world deployed applications of the game-theoretic Stackelberg model in the area of public security and, based on the literature analysis, to discuss the potential and limitations of the model for policy- and decision-makers that are dealing with security measures on various governmental levels. Existing cases clearly indicate that the model can contribute to a better design and implementation of the security policy and help implement a better allocation of resources and thus potentially improve the effectiveness of security measures. On the other hand, the paper also discusses some limitations and potential future adjustments of the model together with points for further research.

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Section: G) Network Security Gamesmentioning

confidence: 66%

Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

Špačková

Špaček

2020

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

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“…Based on the characteristics of offensive and defensive confrontation in the dynamic target defense environment, Liu et al [19] proposed single-stage and multi-stage offensive and defensive game models based on incomplete information dynamic games, and presented a refined Bayesian equilibrium solution algorithm. Ge et al [20] proposed a Stackelberg Security Game defense strategy generation method based on incomplete information, which solved the shortcomings of the lack of active defense capabilities of both parties in the attack and defense game in the research of network defense strategy.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2021

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Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers.

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Defense Strategy Selection Method for Stackelberg Security Game Based on Incomplete Information

Cited by 2 publications

References 7 publications

Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

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