Defining ‘Intrinsic’

Langton, Rae; Lewis, David

doi:10.1515/9783110292596.17

Cited by 52 publications

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“…According to the standard view, intrinsic are all and only those properties that an object has irrespective of whether or not there are other contingent objects; in brief, having or lacking an intrinsic property is independent of accompaniment or loneliness (see Langton & Lewis 1998 and for a refinement Lewis 2001). All other properties are extrinsic or relational, consisting in the object bearing certain relations to other objects.…”

Section: Moderate In Contrast To Radical Structural Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moderate structural realism about space-time

2006

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This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural realism of Worrall and the -radical -ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism, objects and relations (structure) are on the same ontological footing, with the objects being characterized only by the relations in which they stand. We show how this position fares well as regards philosophical arguments, avoiding the objections against the other two versions of structural realism. In particular, we set out how this position can be applied to space-time, providing for a convincing understanding of space-time points in the standard tensor formulation of general relativity as well as in the fibre bundle formulation. Moderate in contrast to radical structural realismStructural realism is a position in the philosophy of science that has been much debated recently. It is the view that only structure in the sense of the relations that are instantiated in the world is real or at least is all that we can know. The latter position is known as epistemic structural realism, the former one as ontic structural realism (this distinction goes back to Ladyman 1998). The main motivation of epistemic structural realism is to steer a middle course between the no miracle argument for scientific realism and the argument from pessimistic induction for instrumentalism. The main motivation -and application -of the form of ontic structural realism that has been developed hitherto is the interpretation of quantum physics. The aim of this paper is to set out (1) a moderate ontic or metaphysical structural realism that puts objects on the same footing as structure and (2) to apply this position to space-time, arguing in particular that it leads to a convincing view about spacetime points. The current discussion on structural realism goes back to Worrall (1989, in particular 117-123). Worrall's aim is to pay heed to both the argument from pessimistic induction -that is, the claim that since most of our past scientific theories have turned out to be false, it is likely that our present and future scientific theories will endure the same fate -and the no miracle argument, that is, the claim that the predictive success of our scientific theories would be a miracle if they were not tracking truth. Worrall's middle way consists in three theses: 1) Structure in the sense of relations among physical objects and as captured by the mathematical equations of a scientific theory is all that we can know. 2) There is continuity in our views about structure despite theory change: the views about structure of a predecessor theory can be construed as an approximation of the views about structure of the successor theory. 3) We cannot know the intrinsic properties of the physical objects that underlie structure.

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Section: Moderate In Contrast To Radical Structural Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moderate structural realism about space-time

2006

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“…Intrinsic are all and only those properties that an object possesses irrespective of whether or not there are other contingent objects; in brief, having or lacking an intrinsic property is independent of accompaniment or loneliness (Langton &Lewis 1998 andsee Hoffmann 2008, part 1, for a detailed discussion of intrinsic properties). The most prominent conception of a metaphysics of categorical and intrinsic properties is the position known as Humean metaphysics in today's philosophy.…”

Section: Categorical Vs Causal Properties In Analytic Metaphysicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism

Esfeld

2009

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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Ontic structural realism is the view that structures are what is real in the first place in the domain of fundamental physics. The structures are usually conceived as including a primitive modality. However, it has not been spelled out as yet what exactly that modality amounts to. This paper proposes to fill this lacuna by arguing that the fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence, being powers. Applying the debate about causal vs. categorical properties in analytic metaphysics to ontic structural realism, I show that the standard argument against categorical and for causal properties holds for structures as well. Structural realism, as a position in the metaphysics of science that is a form of scientific realism, is committed to causal structures. The metaphysics of causal structures is supported by physics, and it can provide for a complete and coherent view of the world that includes all domains of empirical science. IntroductionOntic structural realism is a current in contemporary metaphysics of science that maintains that in the domain of fundamental physics, there are structures in the first place rather than objects with an intrinsic identity. Its main motivation is to develop a tenable version of scientific realism in form of an ontology that meets the challenges of modern physics, giving an account of entanglement in quantum physics and of space-time in the theory of general relativity. The claim is that there are structures of entanglement instead of objects with an intrinsic identity in the domain of quantum physics (Ladyman 1998, French & Ladyman 2003, Esfeld 2004 and metrical structures, which include the gravitational energy, instead of space-time points with an intrinsic identity in the domain of the theory of general relativity (Esfeld & Lam 2008; cf. also Slowik 2005). The founders of ontic structural realism, Steven French and James Ladyman, tend to hold that there are structures all the way down; if there are objects at all, these are derived from the structures as being nodes of structures, instead of structures requiring objects that stand in them (Ladyman 1998, French & Ladyman 2003, French 2006; but see also the more balanced position in Ladyman & Ross 2007, ch. 2 to 5). They thus invite the objection that the notion of structures without objects is not intelligible (e.g. Busch 2003 and Psillos 2006, 562-566). However, a more moderate version of ontic structural realism has recently been developed in reply to that objection, proposing that physical structures are networks of concrete, qualitative physical relations among objects that are nothing but what stands in these relations, that is, do not possess an intrinsic identity over and above the relations in which they stand (Esfeld 2004, Esfeld & Lam 2008, Floridi 2008. This position takes notably the entangled states of elementary quantum systems and the metrical relations among space-time points to be The modal nature of structures 2 concrete structures in this sense. On this more moderate version, no paradox arise...

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“…For a recent discussion of AB, see Field 2004. 2 Sparse properties are discussed, among others, by Armstrong 1979, Lewis 1986: 59-69, Swoyer 1996, Mellor and Oliver 1997: 1-33, and Shaffer 2004 See Khamara 1988, Humberstone 1996, Langton 1998, and Langton and Lewis 1998 single out a property -Being an electron -or, rather, does it refer to an array of properties, perhaps a gerrymandered one? I shall label this the Singling Out Question (SOQ):…”

Section: §1 Singling Out Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dispositions and Their Intentions

Borghini¹

2009

Debating Dispositions

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-Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of realityi.e., dispositions -are properties, that may exist in the natural world and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend a fresh version of the intentional understanding of dispositions. I start by distinguishing two questions about properties, respectively addressing their identity conditions and their individuation conditions. I, then, define categorical and dispositional properties in terms of their qualitative character, and examine their identity and individuation conditions. I conclude that the attribution of intentions is a conceptual tool: it was introduced in order to help specifying the conditions of individuation of a disposition; however, such attribution does not affect the identity of a disposition.

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Defining ‘Intrinsic’

Cited by 52 publications

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Moderate structural realism about space-time

Moderate structural realism about space-time

The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism

Dispositions and Their Intentions

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