Defying institutional failure: learning from the experiences of anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries

Abstract

This article compares the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in four Asian countries: the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) in Thailand, and the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC). The CPIB and ICAC are more effective than the NCCC and KICAC because of the political will of the governments in Singapore and Hong Kong and the more favourable policy contexts of these two city-states. The lack of political will in curbing corruption in Thailand and South Korea is reflected in the fact that the NCCC and KICAC are not as well staffed or funded than the CPIB and ICAC. Moreover, the KICAC is the weakest of the four ACAs as it does not have the power to investigate corruption cases. The policy contexts of Thailand and South Korea are less favourable because of their larger populations and land area, and lower GDP per capita. To avoid institutional failure, ACAs must be supported by their governments in terms of the provision of adequate personnel and budget. They must also be able to investigate all cases of corruption without any political interference. The example of the KICAC shows the futility of establishing an ACA without the ability to investigate corruption cases.

Watchdogs or guard dogs: Do anti-corruption agencies need strong teeth?

“…Often, the latter agencies are dismissed as ''toothless'' for their lack of investigative powers. For example, corruption prevention institutions in South Korea and Slovenia have been dismissed as toothless (Kuris, 2013b;Quah, 2010). Critics argue that such agencies lack the means to pursue corruption effectively, whether or not they have the will to do so.…”

Dynamics of Corruption and Citizens’ Trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies in Three South Asian Countries

“…The ruling elite in a society should come to an agreement about the possible game rules for how a particular public institution should perform. This is what the anti-corruption agencies in Singapore and Hong Kong did, and it is why several studies (e.g., Tangri and Mwenda 2006;Quah 2007Quah , 2010De Maria 2008) stress the need for ACAs to be independent of political leaders. Following this tack, Quah (2007) focuses on two aspects: first, political leaders must not interfere in an ACA's daily operation, and second, an ACA must be able to investigate any political leader if it is required.…”

Assessing judicial performance in Indonesia: the court for corruption crimes

“…Nineteen of these acquittals were issued in the first four months of the Court's existence [35]. 12 In Samarinda, the Tipikor Court acquitted 14 members of the Kutai Kartanegara regional legislature in four days [32].…”

“…Nuraini had chaired panels that acquitted defendants in at least six cases [33]. 13 12 According to some media reports, the Surabaya court has only twice handed down prison sentences exceeding five years (to Mu'limin Bin Halim and Dr Bagoes Soetjipto). Most sentences have been only one or two years [36].…”

“…As Horowitz has observed, '[if] existing courts are unsatisfactory, one route to quick reform is to circumvent them' [8]. However, unlike anti-corruption agencies, upon which many studies have focused, comparatively little scholarly work has addressed these special courts [9][10][11][12]. Although many of the cases handled by these courts are covered in the local, national and sometimes even international media, there is almost no literature on why they are created and how they perform compared with regular courts.…”