Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory

Hawkins, Darren; Lake, David A.; Nielson, Daniel L.; Tierney, Michael J.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491368.002

Cited by 353 publications

(301 citation statements)

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“…73 Hawkins et al 2006; Given that the bureaucrats' interest in IGO creation exceeded the states' interest, states could select their preferred level of discretion without worrying about shirking or other principal-agent problems.…”

Section: Discussion Of Findingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

Johnson¹,

Urpelainen²

2014

Int Org

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Bureaucrats working in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) regularly help states design new IGOs. Sometimes international bureaucrats possess only limited discretion in institutional design; at other times, they enjoy broad discretion. In fact, they gain discretion even when they openly oppose state preferences. This contravenes conventional thinking about delegation: discretion should decrease as preference divergence between states and international bureaucrats increases. We develop a principal-agent theory of how much discretion states grant to international bureaucrats in the design of new IGOs. This is novel: while principal-agent theories of international delegation are common, scholars have not analyzed principal-agent relationships in the creation of new IGOs. We argue that even an international bureaucracy that disagrees with states' design preferences may enjoy substantial design leeway, due to states' need for bureaucratic expertise. In developing this argument, we employ a formal principal-agent model, case studies, and an original dataset.

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Section: Discussion Of Findingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…6 Keohane 1984;Abbott and Snidal 1998;Koremenos, Lipson, andSnidal 2001. 7 Nielson andHawkins et al 2006.…”

Section: Joint United Nations Program On Hiv/aids (Unaids)mentioning

confidence: 99%

International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

Johnson¹,

Urpelainen²

2014

Int Org

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“…For instance, the Principal-agent theory argues that states hire IOs to perform some functions to achieve the objectives of the former (Nielson and Tierney 2003;Hawkins et al 2006). This logic, combined with the international institutionalist interpretation of states' reliance on IOs to solve transnational issues, largely explains why states have become more involved in existing IOs or endeavoured to establish new ones in the past decades.…”

Section: China: a Rising Power In Global Financial Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

China-IMF Collaboration: Toward the Leadership in Global Monetary Governance

Wang

2017

Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.

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This paper analyses China's collaboration with the IMF in various programmes, including China's participation in IMF technical assistance programmes, IMF country surveillance for China, China's attempt to weaken the US dominance in the international monetary system through the IMF, and the RMB's entry to the SDR basket. The results of these collaboration activities reflect the extent to which the IMF assists China in pursuing leadership in global governance of monetary policies. The paper raises two key points. First, it highlights the impact of Chinese actors' interests and objectives regarding China's domestic economic development and outward expansion on their government's interaction with international organizations. Second, it argues that the result of China-IMF collaboration is determined by two conditions (a) the compatibility between Chinese and IMF interests and objectives regarding key economic and political issues, and (b) China's relative role in the IMF's institutional governance in comparison with the Fund's other member states.

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“…Building on the principalagent approach, the overcoming of information asymmetries and establishment of appropriate incentive frameworks are viewed as key mechanisms through which states ensure that their preferences are reflected in IO behavior (Lake and McCubbins 2006;Kassim and Menon 2003). In addition, the patterns of structural power that are 'locked in' to an IO are seen as vitally important in overcoming disputes amongst states; where materially powerful states have succeeded in shaping the rules of the game in their favor, procedures can be effectively used to ensure that decisions taken reflect their interests (Hawkins et al 2006). Such mechanisms, which include the granting of veto powers or special voting rights to key players, serve to routinize the efficacy of material power as a determinant of outcomes in international arenas.…”

Section: Bargaining and Arguing In International Organizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics

Clegg

2011

Rev Int Organ

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Up on the 12th floor of its 19th Street Headquarters, the IMF Board sits in active session for an average of 7 hours per week. Although key matters of policy are decided on in the venue, the rules governing Boardroom interactions remain opaque, resting on an uneasy combination of consensual decision-making and weighted voting. Through a detailed analysis of IMF Board discussions surrounding the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), this article sheds light on the mechanics of power in this often overlooked venue of global economic governance. By exploring the key issues of default liability and loan conditionality, I demonstrate that whilst the Boardroom is a more active site of contestation than has hitherto been recognized, material power is a prime determinant of both Executive Directors' preferences and outcomes reached from discussions. And as the decisions reached form the backbone of the 'instruction sheet' used by Fund staff to guide their everyday operational decisions, these outcomes-and the processes through which they were reached-were factors of primary importance in stabilizing the operational norms at the heart of a controversial phase in the contemporary history of IMF concessional lending.

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Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory

Cited by 353 publications

References 0 publications

International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

China-IMF Collaboration: Toward the Leadership in Global Monetary Governance

Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics

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