2009
DOI: 10.14201/alh.2798
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Democracia y reforma económica en Argentina (1983-1995): ¿doce años no es nada?

Abstract: Sentir que es un soplo la vida, que veinte años no es nada..." Volver, tango de Carlos Gardel y Alfredo Lepera.

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Cited by 2 publications
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“…Based on these considerations, the general model to be estimated is specified as follows: [1] where g kt denotes the annual growth rate of the k-th component of public expenditure; c t is an indicator of the business cycle measured by GDP growth rates or GDP deviations from the underlying trend estimated by means of the Hodrick and Prescott filter (1997). 10 i t denotes the growth rate of total public revenues, and ε t is a perturbation that follows a Gaussian white noise process such as ε t ~ iidN (0, σ 2 ) that meets the assumptions of a linear regression. In turn, e τ is the dummy variable that accounts for the effects of elections on public expenditure, and then e τ = 1 when the τ-th election is celebrated, and 0, otherwise.…”
Section: Econometric Methodologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on these considerations, the general model to be estimated is specified as follows: [1] where g kt denotes the annual growth rate of the k-th component of public expenditure; c t is an indicator of the business cycle measured by GDP growth rates or GDP deviations from the underlying trend estimated by means of the Hodrick and Prescott filter (1997). 10 i t denotes the growth rate of total public revenues, and ε t is a perturbation that follows a Gaussian white noise process such as ε t ~ iidN (0, σ 2 ) that meets the assumptions of a linear regression. In turn, e τ is the dummy variable that accounts for the effects of elections on public expenditure, and then e τ = 1 when the τ-th election is celebrated, and 0, otherwise.…”
Section: Econometric Methodologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Overall, the emergence of PBuC in the Colombian case might be explained by the survival of some practices and political conflicts that have hindered the consolidation of the Colombian democratic system, such as political clientelism, drug trafficking, internal armed conflict, and erosion of weights and counterweights that are characteristic of mature democracies (Botero, Hoskin & Pachón, 2010). This context offers 18 The presidential elections of 1983, associated to the Process of National Reorganization, mark the return of democracy in Argentina after the military dictatorship (Camou, 1995). Hence, the electoral manipulation of public spending might be explained by the inexperience of democratic system, as Canes-Wrone y Ponce de León (2015) suggest.…”
Section: Evidence Of Pbucmentioning
confidence: 99%