Democratization by Elections? Opposition Weakness in Africa

Abstract

The position of opposition parties in national legislature is critical to any strategy of "democratization by elections". But the third wave of democratization in Africa has resulted in only a limited increase in political competition. Regardless of the nature and quality of electoral institutions, opposition parties have remained numerically weak and fragmented, and unable to carry out their role as a political counterweight to the victorious party and president. The performance of opposition parties indicates that we should question whether Africa's multiparty systems really are progressing. At the very least, the pace of democratic progress has been exceedingly slow.

Electoral Competitiveness, Tax Bargaining and Political Incentives in Developing Countries: Evidence from Political Budget Cycles Affecting Taxation

“…It is equally possible that a large margin of electoral victory could disguise significant intraparty electoral competition (e.g., Giliomee and Simkin 1999). However, a focus on the margin of victory is both conceptually straightforward and captures the core logic of democratic theory, and for this reason is adopted elsewhere in the literature (Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga 2011;Efthyvoulou 2012), and is supported by recent scholarship on electoral competitiveness in Africa (Rakner and van de Walle 2009). 53 The use of this variable presumes that actual electoral competitiveness is closely associated with government expectations of competitiveness when making decisions about taxation prior to the election.…”

“…It is a foundational feature of democratic theory that the incentives generated 3 Brautigam et al 2008. 4 Rakner and van de Walle 2009;Schedler 2002;van de Walle 2003. 5 Prichard 2015.…”

Political parties in Ghana: agents of democracy?

“…Election campaigns are often an unlevel playing field in which incumbents 'obstruct, weaken, harass and divide the opposition' (Olukoshi 1998, 29). The room for political opposition is therefore often limited (Uddhammar, Green, and Söderström 2011; see also Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Incumbent parties frequently try to determine the rules of electoral competition to their own advantage, they deny the opposition access to the media, make use of state resources for their own election campaigns, try to manipulate voters' registers, or introduce constitutional changes in order to keep potentially dangerous oppositional forces away from power.…”

The Prospects and Politics of Social Protection Reform in Zambia

“…Hence, targeting of such programmes is based on political strategic preferences (ibid). Further, the provision of these programmes often fluctuate which may be reflected in short-term strategies as the programmes are utilised strategically to encourage or reward clients (ibid and Rakner and Van de Walle 2009). This typically requires a delivery mechanism that has limited transparency and a weak monitoring and accountability system (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).…”

“…an entitlement to social protection) as it would make people at the base of the support hierarchy more politically autonomous and would hence undermine existing power structures (Harland 2011:8). It also incentivises the adoption of short-term strategies instead of wide-reaching rights-based appeals (Rakner and Van de Walle 2009). But the system, as noted by Magaloni (2006) and Helle and Rakner (2012), appears favourable for incumbents because it creates a loyal class of rural poor.…”