Democratization, Political Institutions, And Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998

Saideman, Stephen M.; Lanoue, David J.; Campenni, Michael; Stanton, Samuel C.

doi:10.1177/0010414002035001008

Cited by 68 publications

(114 citation statements)

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“…Moreover, given the existence of multiple conflict technologies that we emphasize, a spiral of events or a spiral of beliefs is not necessary for the existence of preemptive war motivations. 10 In terms of relationship with other empirical studies on civil war, our findings are broadly consistent with the empirical results of Walter (2006a) on the importance of group concentration; Cederman and Girardin (2007), Reynal-Querol (2002), and Saideman et al (2002) on the importance of ethnic discrimination 11 ; and Buhaug et al (2009) and Gates (2002) on the importance of situations where the rebelling minority group is concentrated in remote peripheral areas, where its odds of winning a local war are larger and conflict tends to be harder to avoid. As far as the empirical literature on inequality and civil conflict is concerned (see e.g.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 86%

Resource concentration and civil wars

Morelli

Rohner

2015

Journal of Development Economics

118

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a b s t r a c tThis paper highlights the importance of natural resource concentration and ethnic group regional concentration for ethnic conflict. The existence of multiple conflict terrains (and hence multiple threat points) is the source of bargaining failure, similar to the one determined by the presence of offensive advantages. The theory predicts war to be more likely when resource concentration and group concentration are high, and the empirical analysis, both at the country level and at the ethnic group level, confirms the essential role of geographic concentration variables for civil war.

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Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 86%

Resource concentration and civil wars

Morelli

Rohner

2015

Journal of Development Economics

118

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“…For a review of greed and grievance hypotheses, see Murshed & Tadjoeddin (2009). 9 Among others, see Saideman et al (2002), Brancati (2006), Tranchant (2007Tranchant ( , 2008 and Bakke & Wibbels (2006). 10 "Holding together" federation is one of three processes of federalism identified by Stepan (1999).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Fiscal Decentralization Conflict Abating? Routine Violence and District Level Government in Java, Indonesia

Murshed

Tadjoeddin

Chowdhury

2009

Oxford Development Studies

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Utilizing a newly created data set the authors examine the relationship between routine/everyday violence and fiscal decentralization in 98 districts of the Indonesian island of Java. By examining possible relationships between fiscal decentralization and routine violence, this paper fills a gap in the literature where the analysis of the relation between fiscal decentralization and violence is relatively scant. Routine violence, which is different from both civil war and ethno-communal conflict, centres around group brawls, popular justice or vigilante violence. Despite the uniform implementation of fiscal decentralization, subnational entities exhibit varying experiences with decentralization, but a common consequence is the increased size of local government. Fiscal decentralization, and the increased size of local government, can alleviate pent-up frustrations with a centralized state, as local government expenditure is seen to satisfy the needs of communities with which people identify more closely. The authors also find that the greater the share of locally generated revenues, the lower the number of violent incidents; but this capacity to generate more local revenues mainly lies in richer districts. Therefore, richer districts are likely to have a lower incidence of violence.

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“…Cross-national studies of a large number of countries have confirmed that countries with a firstpast-the-post (FPTP) electoral system and a unitary state face more violent conflict than countries that have adopted some form of proportional electoral system and federalism. The FPTP and unitary structure generally favour larger groups and marginalise minorities (Cohen, 1997;Saideman et al, 2002).…”

Section: Democratisation Political Institutions and Exclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scholars have shown that political exclusion and inequalities among cultural groups often lead to conflict and erosion of democracies (Gurr, 1993(Gurr, , 2000Horowitz, 2000a;Linz & Stepan, 1996). Others have identified that political institutions facilitate political exclusion (Cohen, 1997;Lijphart, 1977;Saideman et al, 2002).…”

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confidence: 99%

Political Exclusion and the Lack of Democratisation: Cross-National Evaluation of Nepali Institutions using a Majoritarian–Consensus Framework

Lawoti

2007

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

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Going beyond examining single institutions, which is not sufficient to establish a polity's effect on exclusion, the article adapts Lijphart's majoritarianconsensus framework, which analyses ten influential institutions, to evaluate the Nepali polity. The cross-national evaluation shows that the Nepali institutions are not inclusive. As some individual Nepali institutions are exclusionary, combining individual and collective analysis establishes the net effect of political institutions as exclusionary. This study demonstrates that collective political institutions in new multicultural democracies can be evaluated in terms of inclusion/exclusion. Such evaluations are useful in providing the basis for reforming polities to include minorities and consolidate and deepen democracy.

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Democratization, Political Institutions, And Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998

Cited by 68 publications

References 0 publications

Resource concentration and civil wars

Resource concentration and civil wars

Is Fiscal Decentralization Conflict Abating? Routine Violence and District Level Government in Java, Indonesia

Political Exclusion and the Lack of Democratisation: Cross-National Evaluation of Nepali Institutions using a Majoritarian–Consensus Framework

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