Political Exclusion and the Lack of Democratisation: Cross-National Evaluation of Nepali Institutions using a Majoritarian–Consensus Framework

Abstract

Going beyond examining single institutions, which is not sufficient to establish a polity's effect on exclusion, the article adapts Lijphart's majoritarianconsensus framework, which analyses ten influential institutions, to evaluate the Nepali polity. The cross-national evaluation shows that the Nepali institutions are not inclusive. As some individual Nepali institutions are exclusionary, combining individual and collective analysis establishes the net effect of political institutions as exclusionary. This study demonstrates that collective political institutions in new multicultural democracies can be evaluated in terms of inclusion/exclusion. Such evaluations are useful in providing the basis for reforming polities to include minorities and consolidate and deepen democracy.

Citizens’ trust in public and political institutions in Nepal

“…Other observers has emphasized that Nepal's political institutions have until recently been excluding significant socio-cultural groups from democratic participation (for example, Lawoti, 2007). Hence, we could have expected more differentiation between advantaged and disadvantaged groups in terms of institutional support.…”

Nineteen Days in April: Urban Protest and Democracy in Nepal

“…The dominant group members, who control the major political parties, have, effectively, shared power among themselves (Lawoti, 2007). Hence, the post-1990 democratic epoch in Nepal witnessed widespread corruption, grinding poverty, the politicisation of the administration and the continued exclusion of caste and ethnic minorities from the governance of the polity and the economic wealth generated in the country.…”

Institutional Patterns in the New Democracies of Asia: Forms, Origins and Consequences

“…In Nepal and Thailand (until 1997), the cabinet's weakness vis-à-vis parliament is, to a certain extent, a consequence of intraparty factionalism and the weak cohesion of the political parties (Lawoti, 2007;Chambers, 2008). In Nepal and Thailand (until 1997), the cabinet's weakness vis-à-vis parliament is, to a certain extent, a consequence of intraparty factionalism and the weak cohesion of the political parties (Lawoti, 2007;Chambers, 2008).…”

“…Most Asian countries have opted for constitutions that are difficult to amend. In addition, Nepal's Supreme Court is one of the strongest courts in the region in terms of formal provisions and has often placed limits on the other branches of government (Stith, 1996;Lawoti, 2007). In Mongolia and Taiwan (until 2005), amending the constitution requires a three-fourths majority of all members of parliament and the National Assembly, respectively.…”

“…The existing ethnic cleavages were reinforced by social inequalities and economic conflicts (Hutt, 2004). The prolonged discrimination and exclusion of socio-cultural minorities and economically disadvantaged groups from political participation and representation is reflected by the exclusive composition of political parties, parliament, and cabinet; the state administration and the judiciary, which are all dominated by the cultural, and resource-wise dominant group, the Caste Hill Hindu Elite (Lawoti, 2005(Lawoti, , 2007Pradhan and Shrestha, 2005: 25). Furthermore, some 'consensus elements' , such as judicial review and a rigid constitution further weakened the capacity of the democratic system to accommodate conflict between different socio-cultural groups in society, as they protracted socioeconomic reforms and protected the vested interests of particular minority groups (ibid.).…”