Demokrasi dalam Pemilihan Kepala Desa?  Studi Kasus Desa Dengan Tipologi Tradisional, Transisional, dan Modern  di Provinsi Jawa Barat Tahun 2008-2013

This article examines the practices of patronage and clientelism during village elections. Examining Mekarsari Village, Yogyakarta, this study finds that patronage strategies such as programmatic politics, vote buying, club goods, and individual gifts were used by all candidates during village elections owing to the lack of strong social bonds between candidates and voters. The incumbent with all advantages and access to material resources also used patronise and clientelism as strategy, but in fact, it cannot guarantee they win the election. This suggests that the societal relationships and practices of patronage and clientelism continue to affect voter’s preference. Applying sociological, psychological, and rational approaches to understanding voter behaviour especially in Java, the study found that, apart from the instrumental and social distance considerations, territorial representation also influenced voter’s preference at Village.

Section: Patronage Clientelism and Voter Behaviour In Village Electmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Paradox of Incumbency: Patronage, Clientelism, and Incumbent Defeat in Village Chief Elections

Abheseka

2019

“…First, political parties. Although village candidates and campaigns are not formally backed or conducted by parties, in practice these parties are directly and indirectly involved in elections (Yuningsih & Subekti, 2016). Parties support candidates, fund their campaigns, and help plan and implement strategies.…”

Section: The Socio-political Context Of Ngestiharjomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since Indonesia began its political reform in 1998, and as widespread democratisation and decentralisation have occurred, village elections have begun using ballots. Studies have shown that, as with presidential and local elections, village elections now involve extensive brokerage networks and vote buying (Aspinall & As'ad, 2015;Yuningsih & Subekti, 2016;Aspinall & Rohman, 2017). At the same time, many studies have shown how village-level political machines serve to advance the interests of their candidates.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Machine and Challenger Victory in a Javanese Village Chief Election

Prasetyo¹

2019

Political machines are widely evident in Indonesian elections, particularly in the sale of political services and use of clientelistic strategies. However, in several cases candidates have created political machines without buying political services or employing clientelistic strategies. Using a qualitative approach to examine the 2018 village chief election in Ngestiharjo, Yogyakarta, this article explains how electoral challengers can use political machines without buying political services, as well as the reason such challengers and their machines decide not to employ clientelism in their search for electoral victory. The author shows that several factors, including elite fragmentation, candidate recruitment, socio-political networks, and the existence of a shared enemy effectively nullify the buying of political services and the use of clientelistic strategies. This article shows that local village contexts, as well as reliance on social bonds, enable challengers to avoid the transactionalism and clientelism that have long characterised political machines. This is further supported by the ability of a challenger and his socio-political network to exploit the weaknesses of the incumbent.

“…Owing to these characteristics, urban, suburban, and rural villages have their own unique socio-cultural characteristics, and their residents are likewise different. However, as shown by Yandri (2017) and Yuningsih & Subekti (2016), studies of Indonesia's suburban villages have yet to explore the political dimensions of the land they control or their chiefs' politicisation of land to mobilise voters. Yandri (2017) argued that the low level of suburban voter participation in a South Tangerang local election could be attributed to residents being commuters employed in nearby cities and regencies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, they believed that their lives would be unaffected by the outcome of the election; as they earned their livelihoods elsewhere, local economic empowerment programmes would be ineffective. Meanwhile, Yuningsih & Subekti (2016) investigated the high level of electoral competition in 'Cimekar', which they characterised as a transitional village (one bordering an urban centre and combining rural and urban characteristics). Candidates were motivated to contest the village election because they sought to control-and therefore benefit from-the hectares of village-controlled land (both wet and dry).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Land Discourses, Patronage, And The 2018 Village Election In Baleharjo, Yogyakarta

Disyacitta

Wulandari

Cahyaningrum

2019

This article explores how village chief candidates can utilise a suburban community's understanding of public land use to mobilise political support, taking as its example the village chief election in Baleharjo, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. This article argues that, where village residents still rely on land for their welfare, candidates can politicise land grievances to gather popular support. In Baleharjo, the incumbent received the backing of merchants and investors from predominantly non-agrarian pedukuhan (hamlets) who felt that they had benefitted from the use of village-controlled land for tourism purposes. At the same time, the challenger recognised the hardships of farmers who had been deleteriously affected by such use of village-controlled land, and thus mobilised them on voting day. Applying a qualitative approach, data for this article were collected through interviews and participatory observation over the course of October 2018.