Deontic Logic: An Introduction

Føllesdal, Dagfinn; Hilpinen, Risto

doi:10.1007/978-94-010-3146-2_1

Cited by 99 publications

(43 citation statements)

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“…7 Conditional deontic logics of this variety include the theories presented by Bengt Hansson [1971], Dagfinn Føllesdal andRisto Hilpinen [1971], van Fraassen [1972], and David Lewis [1973]; a useful comparison of these various logics can be found in Lewis [1974].…”

Section: A2 a Comparison With Standard Deontic Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning with Moral Conflicts

Horty

2003

Nous

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Section: A2 a Comparison With Standard Deontic Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning with Moral Conflicts

Horty

2003

Nous

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“…There is much debate whether (RP) is truly paradoxical: von Wright [31] termed it "odd", but later, in his re-interpretation of deontic logic as rules for rational norm-giving [32], called it "not in the least paradoxical". Føllesdal/Hilpinen [11] think it "no more paradoxical than the fact that p∨q is a logical consequence of p", Carmo & Jones [6], in the Handbook of Philosophical Logic, call it "peculiar", and forÅqvist [3], in the same volume, it is not a serious threat but a useful reminder of "the ambiguity of normative phrases in natural language as a possible source of error and confusion".…”

Section: Ross's Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Studies in Deontic Logic.

Forrester¹,

Hilpinen²

1986

Noûs

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Abstract. In a recent paper, Sven Danielsson argued that the 'original paradoxes' of deontic logic, in particular Ross's paradox and Prior's paradox of derived obligation, can be solved by restricting the modal inheritance rule. I argue that this does not solve the paradoxes.In a recent paper, Sven Danielsson [8] argued that that the 'original paradoxes' of deontic logic, in particular Ross's paradox and Prior's paradox of derived obligation, can be solved by restricting the modal inheritance rule.1 Since these paradoxes have troubled deontic logic for three generations, and called the whole enterprise of deontic logic into question, 2 a solution would be extremely welcome. However, I argue that Danielsson's proposal has not succeeded in solving the paradoxes.

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“…Among the several dyadic logics that have been proposed in the literature we recall those by Chellas [70], Alchourrón [3], Lewis [170] (an extension of Hansson's [135]), Føllesdal and Hilpinen [108], and van Fraassen [262]. One difference is that, unlike [170,135,108,262], the logics of [70,3] satisfy the property called strengthening of the antecedent:…”

Section: If Gabriella Killsmentioning

confidence: 99%