Desire and Power in Socrates: The Argument of Gorgias 466A-468E that Orators and Tyrants Have No Power in the City

The Socratic Theory of Motivation

“…That is, every case of desiring something bad is either a case of desiring something bad because it has been mistaken for the good (77d7-e4), or a case of desiring something bad thinking (correctly or incorrectly) that it will benefit and, (since what is beneficial is good) therefore, thinking it good (77d). However, it has been noted (Santas [1979], Penner [1991]) that the conclusion of this argument appears to be other than what Socrates intended. Socrates' hypothesis is that all people desire good things (77b6-cl), but it looks as if the conclusion that he actually reaches is that all people either desire good things or desire bad things thinking them good.…”

“…What Seems Best Penner (1991) has proposed that in order to understand the Socratic claim at Gorgias 468, that doing what you wish is not doing what seems best, we must assume that Socrates does not hold that the verb 'desire' places us into an intentional context. That is, Socrates does not hold that in order to determine the truth value of a statement which has the form S desires X we must look at the object of the verb 'desire' (X) from the point of view of the subject of that verb.…”

“…This hierarchy is found in at least three places in the early dialogues: Gorgias 467, Euthydemus 279 and Lysis 216.5 Irwin ([1977], 78),Penner (1991 and1989) and Santas([1979], 224), all agree that Socrates explains behavior within this framework.6 Socrates removes health and wealth from the list of absolute goods at Euthydemus 281c2-e2 and Meno 87e-8a (cf Vlastos [1991],. 200-32).Brought to you by | Universitaet Giessen Authenticated Download Date | 6/23/15 11:05 AM…”

Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the Sophist

“…This is why Plato rejects the first motivation for giving a uniform analysis to all beliefs, whether true or false. And with respect to the second motivation, inferences that go from our apparent ability to explain other people's behavior without needing to know whether their beliefs are true or not to the claim that the objects of people's states of mind are what they are independent of their truth value is also not justified because as Penner (1991) has convincingly shown, the objects of our desires, namely, actions, are much more complex than is required by such inferences. In other words, such inferences have to oversimplify the objects of our desires to such an extent that it makes such explanations useless.…”

Heidegger on Human Finitude: Beginning at the End

“…See (Segvic ), (Penner and Rowe ), (Kamtekar ), (Mctighe ), (Penner ), and (Santas , Santas ) for interpretations of this claim.…”