Desires, Dispositions and the Explanation of Action

Alvarez, Maria

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0005

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Viewed from another angle, this alleged flaw is actually a feature, one that is characteristic of functionalist accounts of mental states. Fernández's functional characterization of episodic remembering is highly similar to functionalist characterizations of other mental states, like belief (e.g., Leitgeb, 2017) and desire (e.g., Alvarez, 2017). These general sketches of the role played by belief and desire do the work asked of them; theorists recognize the full specification of any particular belief or desire will be longer and more complicated.…”

Section: Functionalism's Failure Of Fitmentioning

confidence: 81%

The failures of functionalism (for memory)

Robins

2021

Estud.filos

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In Memory: A Self-Referential Account, Fernández offers a functionalist account of the metaphysics of memory, which is portrayed as presenting significant advantages over causal and narrative theories of memory. In this paper, I present a series of challenges for Fernández’s functionalism. There are issues with both the particulars of the account and the use of functionalism more generally. First, in characterizing the mnemonic role of episodic remembering, Fernández fails to make clear how the mental image type that plays this role should be identified. Second, I argue that a functionalist approach, which appeals to the overall structure of the memory system and tendencies of mental state types, is ill-suited to the metaphysical question about episodic remembering that is of interest to the causal and narrative theorists with which Fernandez engages. Fernández’s self-referential account of memory has many other virtues, but functionalism is a poor fit for episodic remembering.

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Section: Functionalism's Failure Of Fitmentioning

confidence: 81%

The failures of functionalism (for memory)

Robins

2021

Estud.filos

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“…13. For a discussion of whether and how dispositions can be causes, see Alvarez, 2017;Choi & Fara, 2018. 14.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is Sympathy? Understanding the Structure of Other-Oriented Emotions

Malbois

2022

Emotion Review

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Sympathy (empathic concern) is mainly understood as a feeling for another and is often contrasted with empathy—a feeling with another. However, it is not clear what feeling for another means and what emotions sympathy involves. Since empirical data suggests that sympathy plays an important role in our social lives and is more closely connected to helping behavior than empathy, we need a more detailed account. In this paper, I argue that sympathy is not a particular emotion but a type of emotional experience: those that have another person as focus. I explain what this means and show that this sheds light on why sympathy, rather than empathy, directly motivates altruistic actions.

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“…Second, I deny that wanting has a special connection to motivation. Wanting something is not intrinsically motivating (Schapiro, 2009), a cause of intentional actions (Armstrong, 1968, Davidson, | 145 HUNTER 1963), a behavioral disposition (Alvarez, 2017;Smith, 1994;Stalnaker, 1984), or a form of action itself (Thompson, 2008). Wanting is just lacking something one needs.…”

Section: Huntermentioning

confidence: 99%

Lacking, needing, and wanting

Hunter

2023

Preprint

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<p>I offer a novel conception of the nature of wanting. According to it, wanting is lacking something one needs. Lacking is not a normative notion but needing is, and that is how goodness figures in to wanting. What a thing needs derives from what it is to be a good thing of its kind. In people, wanting is connected to both knowledge and the will. A person can know that she wants something and can act on that knowledge. When she does, she is acting in light of that want and her want is a reason why she acted. There is a close connection between wanting and our wills, not just because we can sometimes choose how to get what we need, but because our choices can determine what we want. We can't simply choose to want something, but in deciding how to live our lives, who to be, and what to pursue, we are free to settle what we want, at least within limits. These connections to knowledge and the will make human wanting rich and morally relevant, but they don't transform human wanting into something special. Wanting is everywhere just a matter of lacking something one needs.<br> </p>

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Desires, Dispositions and the Explanation of Action

Cited by 7 publications

References 3 publications

The failures of functionalism (for memory)

The failures of functionalism (for memory)

What is Sympathy? Understanding the Structure of Other-Oriented Emotions

Lacking, needing, and wanting

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