Deterrence Now

Abstract

Patrick Morgan's authoritative study revisits the place of deterrence after the Cold War. By assessing and questioning the state of modern deterrence theory, particularly under conditions of nuclear proliferation, Morgan argues that there are basic flaws in the design of the theory that ultimately limits its utility. Given the probable patterns of future international politics, he suggests that greater attention be paid to 'general' deterrence as opposed to 'immediate' deterrence and to examining the deterrent capabilities of collective actors such as NATO and the UN Security Council. Finally he contends that the revolution in military affairs can promote less reliance on deterrence by retaliatory threats, support better collective management of peace and security and permit us to outgrow nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This new major work builds upon Patrick Morgan's landmark book, Deterrence (1983).

Indirect Policing: Its Theory, Mechanism, and Application to Combatting Elusive Perpetrators

“…9 For criticisms of classical deterrence theory, see George and Smoke 1974;Jervis 1970;Jervis 1976;Jervis 1979;Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985;Lebow 1981;Lebow 1984;Lebow 2005;Lebow and Stein 1987;Lebow and Stein 1989;Lebow and Stein 1990;Snyder and Diesing 1977;Stein 1987. 10 For deterrence by delegitimization, see Long & Wilner 2014;Wilner 2011;for tailored deterrence, see Bowen 2004;Knopf 2008;Morgan 2009;Payne 2001; for cumulative deterrence, see Almog 2004;Feldman 1982: 67;Lieberman 1994;Morgan 2003; for deterrence by denial, see Freedman 2004:36-40;Snyder 1961;Wilner 2011. 11 For a discussion on preemption and deterrence, see Freedman 2004, 84-108;Sandler and Siqueira 2006. Preemption and deterrence will be expounded in Section III.…”

Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

“…The serious consideration of an attack and significant military escalation are two other important tests of deterrence theory and the optimists' position. 107 On the first test, this article provides considerable evidence that India's leaders thoroughly considered attacking Pakistan in 1999 and 2001-02. A challenge to this point is that India's leaders were not serious about major military operations, and their war rhetoric and mobilization only sought to catalyze U.S. involvement.…”

To Martyr or Not to Martyr: Jihad is the Question, What Policy is the Answer?

“…Thus, firm inferences cannot be made about the universe of nominally successful deterrent outcomes; that is, possible actions that may have been thought about, but not initiated. In other words, recalling the more general problem of deterrence theory, it is typically much easier to say when and why deterrence has failed (i.e., an attack occurs) than when or why it has succeeded (Achen and Snidal 1989;Huth and Russett 1993;Lebow and Stein 1989;Lieberman 1994;Morgan 2003;Orme 1987). A similar point can be made about early treatments that addressed terrorist phenomena directly.…”

“…Although policies that encompass a comprehensive doctrine, relevant instrumentalities, and high credibility may significantly impact terrorists' actions in pursuit of instrumental goals, as far as fundamental goals are concerned, it may be that, short of concessions by the defender, nothing will dissuade terrorists from some form of action, and such "success" may be questionable, at best, even if the terrorists get everything that they say that they want. In traditional deterrence theory, a defender's potential policies have been grouped under three, interrelated, but analytically separable headings (Morgan 2003), which can aid us in the organization of this discussion.…”