Developing the Personal Minimums Tool for Managing Risk During Preflight Go/No-go Decisions

Expert and Novice Pilot Perceptions of Static In-Flight Images of Weather

“…This distinction appears to be somewhat consistent with the two main approaches to the analysis of aeronautical decision making (experiential and motivational) that are found within the literature (Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2001). However, it should be noted that approaches to teaching decision making in aviation have generally focused on the motivational or the experiential aspects of decision making separately (Adams & McConkey, 1990;Kirkbride, Jensen, Chubb, & Hunter, 1996). The failure to integrate the two approaches in decision-making training (Childs, 1986) may explain the lack of improvement in the rate of weather-related accidents in general aviation in recent years (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 1996).…”

Improving pilots’ risk assessment skills in low-flying operations: The role of feedback and experience

“…Nevertheless, there is acknowledgement of the significance of skilled risk assessment as part of the successful management of flight (O'Hare, 1992;Wiegmann et al, 2002). The result has been an approach to risk assessment in general aviation in which pilots are encouraged to reflect on their skills, experience, and abilities as a basis for the development of personal limitations or 'minimums' that reduce exposure to hazards that threaten the safety of the aircraft or its occupants (Kirkbride et al, 1996).…”

Flying Solo

“…The factors constituting these go or no-go elements are still not fully understood in relation to take-off decisions. Further research is needed as this process is key to pilot safety, since hazards identified on the ground have the potential to worsen during flight (Kirkbride, Jensen, Chubb, & Hunter, 1996). McElhatton, and Drew (1993) illustrate this, reporting that 90.4% of errors occur either during pre-flight (63.2%) or taxi-out (27.2%), while 72.8% of all incidents/accidents occurred during or after take-off; indicating a relatively delayed effect of mistakes and the importance of their recognition prior to taking off.…”

“…There was pronounced variation in how pilots approached the scenarios depicting compromised pilot performance; fatigue and illness were perceived as potential risks to flight safety, whereas stress was not. This may indicate a misperception of risk since pilot checklists such as the IMSAFE (Kirkbride et al, 1996) raise awareness of the dangers of flying while physiologically or psychologically unfit. The checklists include elements of fatigue, stress, and illness, all of which have been reported as having the potential to impair cognitive performance (Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007).…”