I examine the origins of ordinary racial thinking. In doing so, I argue against the thesis that it is the byproduct of a unique module (e.g. a folk-biology module). Instead, I defend a pluralistic thesis according to which different forms of racial thinking are driven by distinct mechanisms, each with their own etiology. I begin with the belief that visible features are diagnostic of race. I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have an important, albeit delimited, role to play in sustaining this belief. I then argue that essentialist beliefs about race are driven by some of the mechanisms responsible for "entitativity perception": the tendency to perceive some aggregates of people as more genuine groups than others. Finally, I argue that coalitional thinking about race is driven by a distinctive form of entitativity perception. However, I suggest that more data is needed to determine the prevalence of this form of racial thinking. I conclude by discussing potential ways in which this pluralistic approach will advance our understanding of racial prejudice, racial stereotyping, and the ethics of racial categorization.
Face recognition and the visual markers of raceOne belief that is central to folk thinking about race is that the members of different racial groups are distinguished by bodily features, such as skin color and facial physiognomy (see Glasgow, 2009, 69, 119;Hardimon, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996, 155). The centrality of this belief is reflected in the fact that some individuals are seen as more typical-looking for a given racial group than others (Maddox, 2004, p. 383). For example, Black men are stereotypically thought to have "dark skin tone, broad noses, full lips, and tightly curled hair" (Maddox & Perry, 2018, p. 58).Research has also shown that when a member of a racial group is seen as highly typical for that group, they are subject to more prejudice and stereotyping than other members. Maddox calls this racial phenotypicality bias (Maddox, 2004; see also Maddox & Perry, 2018).The consensus among biologists and race scholars is that there is no non-arbitrary way to sort people according to the visible markers of race (e.g., see Zack, 2002, p. 43). Nonetheless, the belief that visible features are diagnostic of race is still widespread among the folk. Where does this belief come from? In what follows, I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have a key role to play.