Dialoguing and negotiating with terrorists: any prospect for Boko Haram?

Nwankpa, Michael

doi:10.1080/19434472.2016.1189445

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…According to Falode [7], the kinetic responses partly emanated from the perception that insurgent is national traitors and thus need a crush, and sympathizer be intimidated, while the population hosting them to maim to withdraw support for the insurgents. The kinetic approach of the government symptomized in 2009 when Umar Musa Yar'adua ordered a military crackdown on the insurgent when the insurgent embarked on the weeklong anti-government and anti-west uprising in Maiduguri [14]. The most popular account of military history is the mobilization of the Special Joint Task Force (SJTF), a combine security formation of the Nigerian army, navy, air force, police, customs, and other allied agencies.…”

Section: Responses To Boko Haram By Nigeria Governmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Militia Counterinsurgency: Perspective on the Motivations of Civilian Joint Task Force Militia Participation in Northern Nigeria

Gana¹

2020

Vestn. Ross. univ. družby nar., Ser. Gos. munic. upr.

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Since the year 2013, Nigeria’s northeastern region epicenter of the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency waging war for the establishment of an Islamic State has witnessed mass participation of people in a civil militia group. The militia group colloquially describing itself Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was formed to combat the Boko Haram rebellion. Perhaps, the participation of the CJTF in the combating activities was reportedly influential in reducing the Boko Haram hostilities in most communities. Prior to the CJTF, the counterinsurgency approaches of the Nigerian governments’ Special Joint Task Force and the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Member States of Lake Chad Basin Commission was faced with lackadaisical performances. Whereas the CJTF was reportedly successful, however, the interrupted participation of the people despite the attendant human and material cost has risen suspicion among the population and the critical literature about the groups’ true motivation. This article, therefore, investigated the motivations of the CJTF in northeastern Nigeria. The study was conducted through a qualitative approach designed in a case study. The data was collected from thirteen informants from three groups - CJTF, Community Leaders and State/Local Government authorities. The technique of data collection is in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. The finding revealed personal incentive factors of monetary/material gains, and the futuristic interest of employability drives peoples’ participation. To address the economic interests of the CJTF and as a panacea to prevent the manifestation of the security threats associated with the CJTF group, the study recommends for the establishment of charity centers to receive contributions from well to do citizens to ameliorate the economic needs of the participants. The government should also propound strong legal mechanisms to regulate the activities of the CJTF militia.

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Section: Responses To Boko Haram By Nigeria Governmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Militia Counterinsurgency: Perspective on the Motivations of Civilian Joint Task Force Militia Participation in Northern Nigeria

Gana¹

2020

Vestn. Ross. univ. družby nar., Ser. Gos. munic. upr.

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“…In addition, a British-born Nigerian military officer who deserted the army, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, was accused of complicity in the 2014 bombings at Nyanya, Abuja (Montclos, 2014). University academics such as Musa Kabir of the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University, Bauchi State and Dr Mohammed Nazeef Yunus of Kogi State University and many students voluntarily tore up their certificates or dropped out of school to join the organisation (Nwankpa, 2017). Clearly, these individuals' motivation for joining the group stems from the fact that the ideology or the belief of the group resonates with them.…”

Section: The Place Of Soft Power In Boko Haram Terrorismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From the early 2000s until 2009, the sect attracted many youth (especially those that were unemployed) from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, and its welfare services and opposition to the corrupt secular government and its rhetoric inspired admiration among many Nigerians (Nwankpa, 2017). Yusuf distributed vehicles and motorcycles to unemployed youth that joined Boko Haram and the group also provided food and shelter (Olojo, 2013).…”

Section: The Place Of Soft Power In Boko Haram Terrorismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He further divided political-based strategies into hard politics or a hard power approach that is enemy-centric and soft politics or a soft power approach that is population-centric. Nwankpa (2017) dubs the hard power approach a war model and the soft power one a non-war model. United Nations (UN, 2006) counter-terrorism strategies emphasise four pillars:…”

Section: Terrorism-soft Power: Any Nexus?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, there is an emerging literature that explores non-violent attributes and the significance of soft power in terrorism and counter-terrorism operations (Aljunied, 2012; Grossman, 2015; Levitt, 2006; Rineheart, 2010). In the case of Boko Haram, while there has been an attempt to engage with the various counter-terrorism approaches that have been employed by the Nigerian government (Montclos, 2014; Nwankpa, 2017; Onapajo, 2017; Sampson, 2016), there has been no deliberate and detailed effort to engage the group’s soft power and the utility of soft power in the government’s counter-terrorism efforts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context

Tella

2017

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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Given terrorists’ use of violence in pursuit of their objectives and violent counter-terrorism measures, terrorism is not often associated with soft power. Nevertheless, terrorist organisations subscribe to ideologies that are appealing to certain individuals and/or segments within their immediate environment and beyond. Similarly, counter-terrorism initiatives that embrace the utility of soft power might be more successful than those that rely on the use of naked force. While the soft power of terrorist organisations has received scant attention, there has been modest scholarly inquiry into a soft power approach to counter-terrorism. However, no comprehensive research has been conducted on the place of soft power in Boko Haram’s activities and the Nigerian government’s efforts to end their campaign. This article offers a new perspective to the burgeoning literature on Boko Haram terrorism by examining whether or not it possesses elements of soft power that are appealing to certain Nigerians. It also examines if the Nigerian government has adopted a soft power approach in its counter-terrorism efforts. The article concludes that effectively tackling the sect will require a smart power strategy.

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Beyond Criminal Prosecutions: Alternatives and Adjuncts

Ojo-Adewuyi

2024

International Criminal Justice Series

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Dialoguing and negotiating with terrorists: any prospect for Boko Haram?

Cited by 7 publications

References 31 publications

Militia Counterinsurgency: Perspective on the Motivations of Civilian Joint Task Force Militia Participation in Northern Nigeria

Militia Counterinsurgency: Perspective on the Motivations of Civilian Joint Task Force Militia Participation in Northern Nigeria

Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context

Beyond Criminal Prosecutions: Alternatives and Adjuncts

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