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Violence in Nigeria has a tendency to shape-shift - from violent crimes, such as kidnapping and robbery, to various expressions of political violence, such as terrorism and insurgency, as well as police and military brutality.  Indeed, because of this, it’s difficult to talk about one type of violence without appreciating not only how it relates to specific contextual conditions but also to other forms of violence, which often overlap each other. Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999 the term ‘terrorism’ has increasingly been a part of the national discourse on security. On the one hand, the government refers to countering terrorism within the framework of its national security agenda while on the other hand, insurgent movements, namely those that have emerged in the southern Niger Delta region as well as the northeast, have increasingly used terrorism as one of many tactics within their violent campaigns. Though one can certainly make the argument that terrorism in Nigeria has been a growing concern, particularly in the last decade, analysis tends to look at the phenomenon in isolation rather than considering how it is connected to other forms of violence, and more importantly, how state responses to organized violence drive non-state groups to adopt new tactics and escalate conflict. To fill this gap this article will look at how terrorism is understood and experienced in Nigeria and how its conceptualization shapes the practice of counter-terrorism. Our analysis will capture both international and domestic factors - including the impact of 9/11 and subsequent EU and US efforts to counter terrorism in Nigeria - as well domestic realities, namely the societal impact of Nigeria's 1999 transformation from long military to democratic rule as well as the more recent insurgencies in the Niger Delta (2005-2009) and in the northeast (2009-present). Combined, analyzing the domestic and international considerations over a 15-year time period will allow us to trace how the conceptualization of terrorism and practice of counter-terrorism has changed over time.

Since the abduction in 2014 of 276 high school girls in a remote village, Chibok, in Borno state, Nigeria, the activities of the proscribed group Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram, has received elevated domestic and international attention, as has the Nigerian government's strategy to deal with the group. Criticisms of the government's ineffective handling of the situation have been made by a number of foreign governments, and several of them have offered military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement assistance to Nigeria. From a political economy perspective, this article presents a critical reading and analysis of the local and international response to Boko Haram. It finds that an interest in the "securitization" of development prevails over a genuine peace and security agenda.

This chapter provides a historical background to Boko Haram’s insurgency by discussing its theological rationale and argument. Particularly, it focuses on the last three years before Boko Haram transformed into a full-blown insurgent group in 2009 and draws attention to the extensive religious debates between the leadership of Boko Haram and the religious scholars and establishment in northern Nigeria. The chapter also presents the socio-political events and conditions within and without Nigeria that may have contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram and inspired Boko Haram’s Jihad. In this chapter, Muhammad Yusuf, the charismatic founder of Boko Haram and his deputy and current leader, Abubakar Shekau goes to extensive length in establishing the group’s creed, religious ideology and raison d’etre.