2009
DOI: 10.3790/staa.48.3.387
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Die Bedeutung von Interpretationsmethoden und Dogmatik in der Entscheidungspraxis des Bundesverfassungsgerichts

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Cited by 8 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Otherwise, progress towards further integration would hinge exclusively on the decisions of the Council and the Parliament regarding secondary law. In fact, Kranenpohl reports a similar finding from his interviews with German constitutional judges, who state that judgments have to remain ambiguous in order to allow for appropriate judgments in the future (Kranenpohl 2009). If even national constitutional judges see themselves as being faced with contradictory demands to provide stability while remaining flexible enough for future imponderables, this must be all the more relevant within a dynamically developing and expanding union.…”
Section: Adjudication As a Source Of Legal Uncertaintymentioning
confidence: 74%
“…Otherwise, progress towards further integration would hinge exclusively on the decisions of the Council and the Parliament regarding secondary law. In fact, Kranenpohl reports a similar finding from his interviews with German constitutional judges, who state that judgments have to remain ambiguous in order to allow for appropriate judgments in the future (Kranenpohl 2009). If even national constitutional judges see themselves as being faced with contradictory demands to provide stability while remaining flexible enough for future imponderables, this must be all the more relevant within a dynamically developing and expanding union.…”
Section: Adjudication As a Source Of Legal Uncertaintymentioning
confidence: 74%
“…The ECJ, therefore, typically requires complex individual assessments in light of its own interpretative guidelines, but leaves it to national courts to apply these guidelines to the facts of a particular case. Moreover, it also has to keep European law, being constitutional law, dynamic to respond adequately to new conflict constellations – a necessity relevant for all constitutional courts (Kranenpohl , p. 389). For the ECJ, flexibility also relates to its self‐perceived role as motor of European integration.…”
Section: The Separation Of Powers At the National And The Supranationmentioning
confidence: 99%