Direct Election of Village Head as a Trigger of Corruption Behavior

Abstract

Direct election of village head in Indonesia is a simple form of democracy intended for village people. Many political dynamics occurred before and after the election of the village head. The practice of patron-client that colours the political process that occurs makes the tug of war between the competing camps in contestation increasingly stringent. Kinship seems to be a substantial capital to gain power. Direct election of village head that has a purpose of finding candidates for leaders who are superior and able to advance the village as if not a top priority. This paper seeks to describe how the democratic process in direct village head elections in Indonesia encourages the emergence of corrupt behavior by the village head. This paper will also present various findings that show that elected leaders tend to only pay attention to the interests of the supporters (clients) rather than the interests of village communities in general. It indicates as if the structural change in the regulation governing village governance did not have a significant impact on cultural issues in the village. Data were collected by interview, observation, and documentation as a field study. However, community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the ease of social assistance from the village government. In immaterial supporters want easy access to village administration. It indicates as if the structural change in the regulation governing village governance did not have a significant impact on cultural issues in the village. Data were collected by interview, observation, and documentation as a field study. However, community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the ease of social assistance from the village government. In immaterial supporters want easy access to village administration. It indicates as if the structural change in the regulation governing village governance did not have a significant impact on cultural issues in the village. Data were collected by interview, observation, and documentation as a field study. However, community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the ease of social assistance from the village government. In immaterial supporters want easy access to village administration. community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the ease of social assistance from the village government. In immaterial supporters want easy access to village administration. community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the e...

Comparative Study of Money Politics in Batu City and Sampang Regency in Village Head Elections

“…This study confirms other research findings (Akbar et al, 2023;Alam et al, 2021;Aspinall & Rohman, 2017;Deviria, 2017;Erinanda, 2019a;Fitriyah, 2016;Hidayat & Miskan, 2019;Jatri & Azalia, 2022;Mulyadi & Maulana, 2022;Ramadhan et al, 2018;Virananda et al, 2021) that Pilkades results in money politics. All of these findings show the destruction of village democracy because it facilitates the prevalence of money politics, which directly impacts the quality of elected leadership.…”