Distinct neural contributions to metacognition for detecting (but not discriminating) visual stimuli

Mazor, Matan; Friston, Karl J.; Fleming, Stephen M.

doi:10.1101/853366

Cited by 26 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Building on our factorial design, we included linear and quadratic terms for coherence and context as parametric modulators of the neural response to the context screen. In this model, the quadratic context term captures the intuition that larger shifts in the mapping from private to public confidence are required when playing with both low-confidence and high-confidence partners ( Figure 3B ), whereas the quadratic coherence term controls for potential non-linear influences of an internal sense of confidence on the neural response ( Mazor et al, 2020 ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private–public mappings in human prefrontal cortex

Bang

Ershadmanesh

Nili

et al. 2020

eLife

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A core feature of human cognition is an ability to separate private states of mind – what we think or believe – from public actions – what we say or do. This ability is central to successful social interaction – with different social contexts often requiring different mappings between private states and public actions in order to minimise conflict and facilitate communication. Here we investigated how the human brain supports private-public mappings, using an interactive task which required subjects to adapt how they communicated their confidence about a perceptual decision to the social context. Univariate and multivariate analysis of fMRI data revealed that a private-public distinction is reflected in a medial-lateral division of prefrontal cortex – with lateral frontal pole (FPl) supporting the context-dependent mapping from a private sense of confidence to a public report. The concept of private-public mappings provides a promising framework for understanding flexible social behaviour.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private–public mappings in human prefrontal cortex

Bang

Ershadmanesh

Nili

et al. 2020

eLife

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“…Further, it is increasingly recognised that the type of the task for the type I question plays an important role in metacognitive performance. Lee et al (2019) and Mazor et al (2020) showed dissociations both behaviourally and in the neural mechanisms involved in the computation of confidence following discrimination vs. detection tasks. This might be the reason why the literature on domain specificity yields a somewhat mixed picture (Rouault et al, 2018).…”

Section: Dissociations Between Tasks In Metacognitive Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lee et al (2018) showed that the way the type I task is formulatedwhether it is a detection or discrimination taskaffects measures of metacognition, and suggested that discrimination tasks should be used in order to avoid response biases typical in detection tasks. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that confidence judgments following discrimination and detection decisions rely on partially different neural signatures (Mazor et al, 2020).…”

Section: Motor Metacognition: the Current State Of Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring Metacognition of Direct and Indirect Parameters of Voluntary Movement

Arbuzova

Peters

Roed

et al. 2020

Preprint

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were supported by DFG, German Research Foundation (project number 222641018 -SFB/TTR 135). Data, code and pre-registration protocols are available at https://osf.io/kyhu7/ (Experiment 1) and https://osf.io/sy342/ (Experiment 2). The data discussed in this article were first published in "The Confidence Database", https://osf.io/s46pr/ (Rahnev et al., 2020). We have no known conflict of interest to disclose. AbstractWe can make exquisitely precise movements without the apparent need for conscious monitoring.But can we monitor the low-level movement parameters when prompted? And what are the mechanisms that allow us to monitor our movements? To answer these questions, we designed a semi-virtual ball throwing task. On each trial, participants first threw a virtual ball by moving their arm (with or without visual feedback, or replayed from a previous trial) and then made a twoalternative forced choice on the resulting ball trajectory. They then rated their confidence in their decision. We measured metacognitive efficiency using meta-d'/d' and compared it between different informational domains of the first-order task (motor, visuomotor or visual information alone), as well as between two different versions of the task based on different parameters of the movement: proximal (position of the arm) or distal (resulting trajectory of the ball thrown).We found that participants were able to monitor their performance based on distal motor information as well as when proximal information was available. Their metacognitive efficiency was also equally high in conditions with different sources of information available. The analysis of correlations across participants revealed an unexpected result: while metacognitive efficiency correlated between informational domains (which would indicate domain-generality of metacognition), it did not correlate across the different parameters of movement. We discuss possible sources of this discrepancy and argue that specific first-order task demands may play a crucial role in our metacognitive ability and should be considered when making inferences about domain-generality based on correlations.

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“…where observers can in principle process both positive and negative evidence for a particular outcome, and more like detection tasks (e.g., was there a line or not?). Intriguingly, observers in perceptual tasks tend to have poorer insight into their ability to judge absence over presence ( Kanai et al, 2010 ; Meuwese et al, 2014 ), possibly because the former places particular demands on metacognitive self-monitoring mechanisms ( Mazor et al, 2020 ). This asymmetry may have important implications for how agents actively monitor what they cannot control in certain kinds of environments ( Wen et al, 2020 ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illusions of control without delusions of grandeur

2020

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We frequently experience feelings of agency over events we do not objectively influence – so-called ‘illusions of control’. These illusions have prompted widespread claims that we can be insensitive to objective relationships between actions and outcomes, and instead rely on grandiose beliefs about our abilities. However, these illusory biases could instead arise if we are highly sensitive to action-outcome correlations, but attribute agency when such correlations emerge simply by chance. We motion-tracked participants while they made agency judgements about a cursor that could be yoked to their actions or follow an independent trajectory. A combination of signal detection analysis, reverse correlation methods and computational modelling indeed demonstrated that ‘illusions’ of control could emerge solely from sensitivity to spurious action-outcome correlations. Counterintuitively, this suggests that illusions of control could arise because agents have excellent insight into the relationships between actions and outcomes in a world where causal relationships are not perfectly deterministic.

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Distinct neural contributions to metacognition for detecting (but not discriminating) visual stimuli

Cited by 26 publications

References 59 publications

Private–public mappings in human prefrontal cortex

Private–public mappings in human prefrontal cortex

Measuring Metacognition of Direct and Indirect Parameters of Voluntary Movement

Illusions of control without delusions of grandeur

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