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Tsai, Jyh-Fa; Chu, Chih‐Peng

doi:10.1023/a:1022503428001

Cited by 19 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The adoption of second-best congestion pricing and variable traffic condition analyses by Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) and Tsai and Chu (2003) has been central to understanding financial mechanisms in BOT projects [18,19]. This body of work was complemented by the application of the mathematical Pareto model by Niu and Zhang (2013) to scrutinize BOT investments amidst uncertain demand and by Yan and Chong's (2019) use of inequity aversion theory to probe the distribution of risks and benefits within such projects [8,9].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Tollways: Strategizing Carbon-Emissions-Based Government-Owned Public Toll Road Operations in China

Shang,

Lu,

Zhu

et al. 2024

Sustainability

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When build–operate–transfer (BOT) roads are transferred back to the government upon the expiry of their contract, they are typically considered to be public roads and are no longer subject to tolls. However, in China, BOT roads, after being transferred to the government, remain tolled by the government in order to maintain efficiency. Therefore, such roads are termed public toll roads (PTRs). During the operational phase of PTRs, ongoing operating costs become a significant financial burden compared to the initial investment made for their construction. Against the backdrop of global carbon emission efforts, this paper studies the operational strategy of PTRs in terms of car emission costs, which constitute a portion of PTRs’ operation costs. This paper explores the operational strategy of PTRs, including whether the government should operate the road independently or outsource their operation to a competent private firm. Our analysis concludes that the operator should manage PTRs for the entire duration of their operation by maintaining self-financing while also accounting for operation costs. In this study, governmental regulations for the cost of carbon emissions are also studied.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Tollways: Strategizing Carbon-Emissions-Based Government-Owned Public Toll Road Operations in China

Shang,

Lu,

Zhu

et al. 2024

Sustainability

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“…The literature on infrastructure construction and operation under BOT contracts focuses on the perspectives (Meng and Lu, 2017) as follows: cost recovery and benefit analysis (De Palma et al, 2007;Gonçalves and Gomes, 2012;Ge et al, 2019); impact analysis of user heterogeneity (Tan and Yang, 2012); the network perspective for franchising and ownership regimes (Tan et al, 2016;Viton, 1995;Wu et al, 2011); risk assessment (Shi et al, 2016;Venezia, 1977) and the interactions between the government and private firms in BOT contracts (Guo and Yang, 2009;Subprasom and Chen, 2007;Tsai and Chu, 2003). Our work is situated in the specific stream covering the interactions between the government and private firms in BOT contracts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…, 2011); risk assessment (Shi et al. , 2016; Venezia, 1977) and the interactions between the government and private firms in BOT contracts (Guo and Yang, 2009; Subprasom and Chen, 2007; Tsai and Chu, 2003). Our work is situated in the specific stream covering the interactions between the government and private firms in BOT contracts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some scholars focus on the optimal decision of the government and private firms regarding capacity choice and charges. Tsai and Chu (2003), Subprasom and Chen (2007) and Chen et al (2021) explore the road capacity and charges for private road investment under the BOT scheme. Other studies discuss three crucial variables for BOT road projects: the concession period, road capacity and charges.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The impact of government subsidies on build-operate-transfer contract design for charging piles in circular economy

Ding

Xia

Zhao

et al. 2022

IMDS

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PurposeBuild-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts are widely used in the construction and operation of charging piles for new energy vehicles worldwide and stipulate that governments grant charging pile operators franchises for a certain period of time to invest in the construction and operation of the charging piles. The charging piles are then transferred to governments when the concession expires. To encourage charging pile operators to build and operate charging piles, governments usually provide two kinds of subsidies, namely construction and operating subsidies.Design/methodology/approachThe authors establish a typical game model to study the optimal BOT contract between a government and a charging pile operator and their preferences for the two kinds of subsidies.FindingsFirst, the authors show that there are substitution and complementarity effects between the concession period and the subsidy level. Second, the operator prefers the construction subsidy (operating subsidy) when the additional operating cost is low (high). The government prefers the operating subsidy (construction subsidy) when consumer sensitivity to the number of charging piles is low (high) and the concession period is short or long (moderate). Finally, the adjusted joint subsidy can not only improve social welfare but also that the charging pile operator can obtain the same profit as under the operating subsidy at a lower subsidy amount.Originality/valueThis work develops the first analytical model to study two subsidies in the construction and operation of charging piles and investigate the optimal BOT contract and subsidy preferences. The insights are compelling not only for the charging pile operator but also for policymakers in practice from a circular economy perspective.

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“…Yang and Meng [409] regarded the toll and capacity regulation in both monopolistic and competitive road markets. Tsai and Chu [359] analyzed regulation alternatives, in terms of minimum flow and maximum travel cost constraints, on a private BOT highway investment scheme, and they found that regulations have less power in situations with low elastic demand and yield a performance between the cases of welfare-maximization and profit-maximization. Chen and Subprasom [66] demonstrated that a combination of concession period extension and construction cost subsidization policy may enhance the financial feasibility of BOT schemes for both the government and private investors.…”

Section: Private Toll Roads and Capacity Provisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design and evaluation of road pricing: state-of-the-art and methodological advances

2009

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Cited by 19 publications

References 19 publications

Green Tollways: Strategizing Carbon-Emissions-Based Government-Owned Public Toll Road Operations in China

Green Tollways: Strategizing Carbon-Emissions-Based Government-Owned Public Toll Road Operations in China

The impact of government subsidies on build-operate-transfer contract design for charging piles in circular economy

Design and evaluation of road pricing: state-of-the-art and methodological advances

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