Do beliefs about peers matter for donation matching? Experiments in the field and laboratory

Abstract

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Matching Subsidies and Voluntary Contributions: A Review

“…Huck and Rasul (), Karlan et al . (), Gee and Schreck () and Helms McCarty et al . () do not find a significant effect of linear matching on the aggregate, considering matching rates not greater than 1, while Karlan and List () report a significant increase in the extensive margin by 0.4 percentage points, when pooling data on matching rates of 1, 2 and 3.…”

“…This effect is substantial since the likelihood of contributing in the control group is 1.8%. In Huck and Rasul (), Gee and Schreck () and Helms McCarty et al . () the differences in response rates between the control group and the treatment group, which receives a linear match of 1, amount to 0.5, 0.8 and 0.6 percentage points with baseline response rates of 3.7%, 1.6% and 3.0%, respectively.…”

Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

“…36 Other papers that use the QSR to elicit beliefs about a distribution over three or more choices include Terracol and Vaksmann (2009), Danz et al (2012), Hyndman et al (2012) and Gee and Schreck (2018).…”

To what do people contribute? Ongoing operations vs. sustainable supplies

“…Indeed, Gee and Schreck (2018) found that contributions increase when contributors feel their contributions are more effective. They conducted an experiment in which reaching a threshold level of contributions secured matching and showed that this treatment more than doubled contributions.…”