Do Corporate Governance Analysts Matter? Evidence from the Expansion of Governance Analyst Coverage

Abstract

This paper examines the economic consequences of the initiation of governance analyst coverage. Governance analysts process, enhance, and * University of Goettingen.Accepted by Christian Leuz. This paper is based on one part of my dissertation at the Georg-August University of Goettingen. I am deeply indebted to Jörg-Markus Hitz (dissertation chair) for his continuous support and excellent guidance. I am very grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for their excellent guidance and constructive suggestions throughout the whole review process. The paper has further benefited from the insights of Ulf Brüggemann, Hans B. Christensen, Rafael Copat (discussant), N. LEHMANN disseminate governance-related information to capital market participants via, for example, governance reports and ratings. Using an exogenous shock in the United Kingdom, I find that an increase in governance analyst coverage results in increased governance quality, improved liquidity, increased financial analyst following, and improved investor breadth. These findings are consistent with governance analysts creating value for firms via monitoring, information dissemination/production, and investor recognition. JEL codes: G15; G23; G24; G30; G34; M40; M41

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