Do the Weak Stand a Chance? Distribution of Resources in a Competitive Environment

Avrahami, Judith; Kareev, Yaakov

doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01039.x

Cited by 51 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…6 It is well known that for the remaining parameter configurations, (1/n)B A < B B ≤ B A , there is no pure strategy equilibrium for this class of games. A mixed strategy, which we term a distribution of force, for player i is an n-variate distribution function P i : R n + → [0, 1] with support (denoted Supp(P i )) contained in player i's set of feasible force allocations S i and with the set of one-dimensional marginal distribution functions {F i,j } n j=1 , one univariate marginal distribution function for each battlefield j.…”

Section: Budget-constrained Use-it-or-lose-it Costsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields

Kovenock

Roberson

2012

Oxford Handbooks Online

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Conflicts with Multiple BattlefieldsAbstract This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed "battlefields". In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each battlefield and the nature of economies or diseconomies in how battlefield outcomes and costs aggregate in determining payoffs in the overall conflict.JEL-Code: C72, D74, H56.

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Section: Budget-constrained Use-it-or-lose-it Costsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields

Kovenock

Roberson

2012

Oxford Handbooks Online

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“…3 Avrahami and Kareev (2009) focus on contests between players with differing strengths. In their contests the two players have different budgets, and they find that subject behavior is sensitive to the relative budgets in the way predicted by equilibrium.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games

et al. 2015

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A note on versions:The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription.For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk AbstractWe investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battlefields may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed discrete budget across battlefields. Each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The player who wins the battlefields with highest total value receives a constant winner payoff, while the other player receives a constant loser payoff. We focus on apex games, in which there is one large and several small battlefields. A player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. For each of the games we study, we compute an equilibrium and we show that certain properties of equilibrium play are the same in any equilibrium. In particular, the expected share of the budget allocated to the large battlefield exceeds its value relative to the total value of all battlefields, and with a high probability (exceeding 90% in our treatments) resources are spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. In a laboratory experiment, we find that strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, consistent with equilibrium predictions. In the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is strongest, we also find that the large battlefield receives on average more than a proportional share of resources. In a control treatment, all battlefields have the same value and our findings are consistent with previous experimental findings on Colonel Blotto games.

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“…Experimental studies on simultaneous multi-battle contests have examined how different factors such as budget constraint (Avrahami and Kareev, 2009;Arad and Rubinstein, 2012;Mago and Sheremeta, 2014), information (Horta-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer, 2010), contest success function (Chowdhury et al, 2013), asymmetry in resources and battles (Kovenock et al, 2010;Arad, 2012;Holt et al, 2015) impact individual behavior in contests.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Irfanoglu,

Mago,

Sheremeta

2015

SSRN Journal

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Sequential contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a "New Hampshire Effect" -a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Contrary to this prediction, however, our laboratory study of the three-battle contests shows that sequential contests generate significantly higher expenditure than simultaneous contests. In case of sequential contests, we observe significant over-expenditure in all three battles and find no evidence of the "New Hampshire Effect." Despite the strategic advantage, winners of the first battle make similar expenditures in the second battle as losers of the first battle. Moreover, instead of decreasing, subjects increase their expenditure in the second battle relative to the first battle. In case of simultaneous contests, subjects do not employ a uniform expenditure strategy and instead use a "guerilla warfare" strategy by focusing on only two of the three battles. We propose several explanations for these findings and discuss some implications.JEL Classifications: C72, C73, C91, D72

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Do the Weak Stand a Chance? Distribution of Resources in a Competitive Environment

Cited by 51 publications

References 20 publications

Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields

Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields

Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games

New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

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