Do (weak) upper houses matter for cabinet formation? A replication and correction

Abstract

Do upper houses matter for cabinet formation? If so, does it make a difference how powerful they are? The most sophisticated study to give clear answers to these questions is still that of Druckman, Martin and Thies (2005), which argues that upper houses influence cabinet formation, regardless of their formal powers. We dispute these answers theoretically and empirically. Since adjusting cabinet formation to second chamber composition is not necessary and can be costly, we should expect that if upper houses matter at all, their formal powers should matter too. Replication shows that the empirical results are driven exclusively by two countries with weak upper houses, one of which (Ireland) is miscoded. If this case is recoded there is no statistically or substantially significant effect of upper houses, regardless of their power. We conclude that the two questions cannot yet be answered: we need more research based on broader samples in order to assess whether upper houses matter for cabinet formation and whether their formal powers make a difference.

Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes

“…However, Diermeier et al (2007) argue the opposite, claiming that bicameralism would in fact foster reduced coalition size by reducing the number of coalesced partners and favouring minimal winning coalition types, no matter whether the coalition holds a bicameral majority or not. These findings were partially confirmed by Eppner and Ganghof (2015) who found no clear link between bicameralism and coalition formation. 6 Hence, in view of these contradictory studies, it seems that we have no theoretical insights about the potential impact of bicameralism over the coalition formation process in presidential regimes.…”

“… 6. This previous work by Eppner and Ganghof (2015) was actually a methodological critique to Druckman et al’s (2005) findings. Their 2016 work constitutes, thus, a confirmation of the impact of bicameralism over coalition formation, through a more robust demonstration. …”

Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: The veto control hypothesis reconsidered

“…They estimate that majority status in the second chamber triples the chances of a potential government forming. As a replication by Eppner and Ganghof () highlights, however, this effect is solely driven by the cases of Austria and Ireland, whereas Druckman et al. () find no substantial and statistically significant effect for the six cases with absolute veto power.…”

Bicameralism and Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion

“…To some, bicameral institutions matter because the presence of an upper chamber alters prospects for policy outcomes to diverge from the status quo (Druckman, Martin, and Thies 2005; Tsebelis and Money 1997). For others, the influence of institutions over policy outcomes stems from how authorized control over decision making is organized and allocated (Eppner and Ganghof 2015; Lijphart 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Thies and Yanai 2014). Extending both perspectives, we show that the number of chambers matters for responsiveness and, furthermore, so too does the power distribution between them.…”