Dynamic inconsistency and self-control: a planner–doer interpretation

Bénabou, Roland; Pycia, Marek

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00158-1

Cited by 92 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…51 Benabou and Pycia [2002] show that the equilibrium of their two-period "lobbying" model is consistent with these same axioms. As we remarked earlier, the Gul and Pesendorfer axioms are in some ways less restrictive than Assumption 5, and hence than Assumption 5'.…”

Section: Supplementary Appendicesmentioning

confidence: 76%

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

2004

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Abstract:We propose that a simple "dual-self" model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin's paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay, as in the O'Donoghue and Rabin models of quasi-hyperbolic utility, and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist. The base version of our model is consistent with the Gul-Pesendorfer axioms, but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive load. 1 "The idea of self-control is paradoxical unless it is assumed that the psyche contains more than one energy system, and that these energy systems have some degree of independence from each other." (McIntosh [1969]) This paper argues that a simple "dual-self" model gives a unified explanation for a number of empirical regularities related to self-control problems and a value for commitment in decision problems. One of these regularities is the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated economists' models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting: Faced with a choice between consuming some quantity today and a greater quantity tomorrow, some people will choose to consume the lesser quantity today. However, when these same individuals are faced with the choice between the same relative quantities a year from now and a year and a day from now, they choose to consume the greater quantity a year and a day from now.3 A second regularity is Rabin's [2000] paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The paradox is that the risk aversion experimental subjects show to very small gambles implies hugely unrealistic willingness to reject large but favorable gambles. In addition, the model provides a possible explanation of the effect of cognitive load on self-control that is noted by Shiv and Fedorkin, and it predicts that increased costs of self-control lead to increased delay in stationary stopping-time problems, as in O'Donoghue and Rabin [2001].2 Our theory proposes that many sorts of decision problems should be viewed as a game between a sequence of short-run impulsive selves and a long-run patient self. This is consistent with recent evidence from MRI studies, such as McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen [2004], that suggests that short-term impulsive behavior is associated with different areas of the brain than long-term planned behavior. 4 We argue that our dual-selves model explains a broad range of behavioral anomalies, and that it is a better (though still crude 5 ) fit for the modular structure of the brain than the quasi-hyperbolic model, which posits a game between multiple "selves," one in each period. Moreover, the dual-selves model is analytically simpler than the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, as the equilibria of the model can be calculated as the solution to a decision problem. In addition, in standard economic applicatio...

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Section: Supplementary Appendicesmentioning

confidence: 76%

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

2004

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“…Our model is similar to that by Fudenberg and Levine (2006), who study the interaction between a short-run -self‖ and a long-run -self‖. Alternatively, it can be understood as a stochastic version of that by Gul and Pesendorfer, (2001;2004), as in Bénabou and Pycia (2002). Because the focus of this paper is not only theoretical but also empirical, we refrain from a detailed discussion regarding the similarities and differences between the available models.…”

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confidence: 99%

Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

et al. 2016

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We develop a model relating self-control, risk preferences and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. We subject our model to data from an experimental public goods game and a risk experiment, and we measure conflict identification and self-control.As predicted, we find a robust association between self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is weaker for more risk-averse individuals. Free riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place. Our model accounts for the data at least as well as do other models. JEL: C91, D03, H40

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“…Given the lack of restrictions on the shape of F , we can assume without loss of generality that utility is linear in x. To see what our reduced-form temptation means, 6 The authorship inference problem (and the role of self-esteem) di¤erentiates our theory from other planner-doer models, such as those by Bénabou and Pycia (2002), Bernheim and Rangel (2004), Fudenberg and Levine (2006) and Ali (2011). denote the consumption utility function by v, the consumption available by honest means by c h , and the additional consumption available by dishonest means by…”

Section: Basic Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Economic theory has incorporated the idea that people care about self-image (e.g., Rabin 1994, Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg 2003, K½ oszegi 2006, Bénabou and Tirole 2006, Cervellati, Esteban and Kranich 2006, and there is experimental evidence that self-concept maintenance limits dishonesty (Fischbacher and Heusi 2008). Economics has also incorporated the notion that behavior is in ‡uenced by subconscious impulses (e.g., Bénabou and Pycia 2002, Prelec and Bodner 2003, and Berhneim and Rangel 2004, and that past actions may contain information about the self, creating a role for introspective reputation (Prelec and Bodner 2003, Bénabou and Tirole 2002.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing

Bó¹,

Terviö²

2008

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We present an in…nite-horizon planner-doer model of moral standards, where individuals receive random temptations (such as bribe o¤ers) and must decide which to resist. Individual actions depend both on conscious deliberation and on a type re ‡ecting unconscious drives.Temptations yield consumption value, but con…dence in being the type of person who resists temptations yields self-esteem. We identify conditions for individuals to build an introspective reputation for goodness ("moral capital") and for good actions to lead to a stronger disposition to do good. Bad actions destroy moral capital and lock-in further wrongdoing. Economic shocks that result in higher temptations have long-lasting e¤ects on wrongdoing. We show how optimal deterrence can change under endogenous moral costs and how wrongdoing can be compounded as high temptation activities attract individuals with low moral capital.

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Dynamic inconsistency and self-control: a planner–doer interpretation

Cited by 92 publications

References 4 publications

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing

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