Eavesdropping a (Ultra-)High-Definition Video Display from an 80 Meter Distance Under Realistic Circumstances

Meulemeester, Pieterjan De; Scheers, Bart; Vandenbosch, Guy A. E.

doi:10.1109/emcsi38923.2020.9191457

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Thus, it can be concluded that the compromising emission signals produced by commercial devices can be received at distances of several dozen meters. This is confirmed in practical experiments [4], in which it is possible to recover visual information from a distance of about 80 m.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 66%

“…In many cases, they require comparison and evaluation with the requirements that are legally protected. Therefore, the article is limited to presenting the existing threats related not only to the popularly used computer displays (described broadly in [1][2][3][4]7,9,15]), but also to the displays of VoIP terminals and hands-free mode. In the case of these devices, there is very little information about the electromagnetic safety of the processed information.…”

Section: Electromagnetic Compatibility and Protection Of Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such devices use various electrical standards to transmit video signals, which become a source of emissions correlated with the processed information. The occurrence of such phenomenon is described in [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. These papers show not only the essence of the threat but also the methods (solutions) preventing the formation of hazardous emissions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Electromagnetic Safety of Remote Communication Devices—Videoconference

2021

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Devices powered by electricity become sources of electromagnetic emissions in the course of their operation. In the case of devices oriented to process information, these emissions can have a character of revealing emissions, i.e., those whose reception and analysis allow for remote reconstruction of related data. The best known example of this phenomenon is the formation of revealing emissions during the operation of imaging devices: monitors, projectors or printers. Increasingly more often, these components are used for communication in the form of videoconferences with other network users. The article presents the result of tests and analyses of threats related to the use of such solutions (monitors, personal computers, VoIP terminals) for the confidentiality of conversations and the data presented during them. The focus is on video signals; however, the potential possibilities of revealing speech signals were also indicated. Such phenomenon causes a huge threat to data confidentiality because the combination of graphics and sound can undoubtedly contain much more information about the protected data than just graphics or sound separately. The presented results of analyses apply to graphic data, possibilities of non-invasive acquisition of such data, similarity of images and of patterns and reconstructed image and image recognition. The results indicate that there is still a risk of loss of data confidentiality due to a phenomenon of an electromagnetic leakage, and specialized instrumentation is not required for its interception under favorable circumstances. This may particularly apply to audio data that may be accidentally received by home radio receivers. In particular, the presented results of analyses apply to a Special Issue of Symmetry which is characterized by security and privacy in communication systems and networks, signal processing, video and image processing, multimedia communications and electromagnetic compatibility. All these scientific and technical areas have either symmetrical or asymmetrical approaches, and they have to be taken into consideration as a whole in order to choose the best combinations to protect processed information.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 66%

Section: Electromagnetic Compatibility and Protection Of Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Electromagnetic Safety of Remote Communication Devices—Videoconference

2021

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“…The methods of detecting a video image leak, recovering the video synchronization parameters and finally reconstructing the video image are only briefly described in the following section. The more elaborated description of these methods can be found back in our previous work [8], [28].…”

Section: F Video Image Leakage Detection Synchronization Recovery and Reconstructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions

Meulemeester

Scheers

Vandenbosch

2020

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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Video display units (VDUs) using differential signaling technology significantly increase the risk of compromising video information security through leakage emissions. This paper shows that differential signaling cables act as substantial video leakage sources. A concept is proposed which explains the video leakage principles of VDUs using differential signal cables such as the HDMI (high-definition multimedia interface) cable, DVI (digital visual interface) cable and the LVDS (low-voltage differential signaling) cable. The emanations of the LVDS cable are closely examined by measuring simultaneously the differential video signal on the LVDS lines and its near-and far-field leakage emissions. From these measurements several conclusions are drawn which give new insights into the video eavesdropping risk of VDUs using differential signaling methods. Furthermore, a novel video image reconstruction method is proposed which exploits the compromising emanations of a video display unit (VDU) by using frequency demodulation techniques. This paper shows that leaked video emanations of VDUs using differential signaling cables are not only amplitude modulated (AM) but also frequency modulated (FM). This strongly implies that the possible algorithmic toolset of malicious video eavesdroppers is much larger than currently assumed. This paper investigates several VDU setups at a distance of 10 meters, including an ultra-high-definition video display, three different HDMI cables and two notebooks. Additionally, the AM-based and FM-based video image reconstruction results are discussed and compared.

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“…Therefore, there is a risk of information leakage when a malicious attacker attempts to eavesdrop on information in the decryption phase. Attacks that acquire information at the stage where a human perceives information are known as remote visualization attacks, which eavesdrop on information through electromagnetic (EM) emanations leaked from input/output (I/O) devices [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. Recently, the extent of such attacks has broadened This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Novel Remote Visualization of Screen Images Against High-Resolution Display With Divided Screens Focusing on the Difference of Transfer Function of Multiple Emanations

Kitazawa

Arai

Kim

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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Electromagnetic (EM) remote visualization of screen images attacks (RVSIAs) is among the most actively researched topics in hardware security. Target displays are being developed daily; for example, recently developed high-resolution displays have multiple divided areas on the screen, and each area transmits different pixel information. In this case, it is difficult to reconstruct the screen using the conventional methods because the target screen information is leaked by multiple lines at the same frequency and timing, and multiple screen information is mixed into the EM waves. By contrast, in this article, we propose a novel RVSIA method that focuses on the difference in the transfer functions of multiple emanations from a high-resolution display. Considering the structure and signal transmission method of recent high-resolution displays, the proposed attack method observes leaked EM waves from multiple observation positions and alters the receiving frequencies of the receiver. For the first time, we have been able to separate multiple screen information contained in leaked EM waves using an independent component analysis method. In the experiments, we applied the proposed method to an actual laptop PC that divides the screen into multiple areas. As a result, it was possible to reconstruct screen information using the proposed attack method. Thus, the proposed method enables successful attacks against recent high-resolution displays. Furthermore, the measurement equipment employed remains similar to those utilized in the conventional attacks.

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Eavesdropping a (Ultra-)High-Definition Video Display from an 80 Meter Distance Under Realistic Circumstances

Cited by 18 publications

References 10 publications

Electromagnetic Safety of Remote Communication Devices—Videoconference

Electromagnetic Safety of Remote Communication Devices—Videoconference

Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions

A Novel Remote Visualization of Screen Images Against High-Resolution Display With Divided Screens Focusing on the Difference of Transfer Function of Multiple Emanations

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