EC-RAC (ECDLP Based Randomized Access Control): Provably Secure RFID authentication protocol

Lee, Yong Ki; Batina, Lejla; Verbauwhede, Ingrid

doi:10.1109/rfid.2008.4519370

Cited by 100 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…There are some papers which propose to use PKC-based RFID systems [25], [22], [2], [11]. In [25] no specific authentication protocol is mentioned, and the Schnorr protocol [18] and the Okamoto protocol [16] are adopted in [22] and [2] respectively.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [25] no specific authentication protocol is mentioned, and the Schnorr protocol [18] and the Okamoto protocol [16] are adopted in [22] and [2] respectively. However, it is shown that these two protocols are not proper for RFID systems due to their vulnerability against the tracking attack [11]. In [11] EC-RAC is also proposed to solve all the basic properties required in RFID systems.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it is shown that these two protocols are not proper for RFID systems due to their vulnerability against the tracking attack [11]. In [11] EC-RAC is also proposed to solve all the basic properties required in RFID systems. However, the works in [3], [6] showed EC-RAC's vulnerability against tracking attacks and impersonation attacks.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, it is not possible to satisfy the requirements only with symmetric cryptographic algorithms such as hash algorithms and symmetric key encryption algorithms. Furthermore, some conventional PKC based authentication protocols such as the Schnorr protocol [18] and the Okamoto protocol [16] were designed without concerns for the tracking attack, hence they fail to satisfy the un-traceability which is shown in [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper we propose several authentication protocols by revising and expanding EC-RAC [11]. EC-RAC was proposed to resolve these requirements but there have been reports (1) The authors are with the Department of Electrical EngineeringUniversity of California, Los Angeles, 56-125B Engineering IV Building 420 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1594 USA (2) The authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering -ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001, Belgium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Untraceable RFID authentication protocols: Revision of EC-RAC

Lee

Batina

Verbauwhede

2009

2009 IEEE International Conference on RFID

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Abstract-Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems are steadily becoming paramount due to their vast applications such as supply chains, inventory, tolling, baggage management, access control etc. While they have potentials to improve our lives, they also present a privacy risk. Privacy is often overlooked in many applications, but due to pervasiveness of RFIDs the issue has to be taken into account. However, additional security always comes at price and the scarceness of resources on a tag makes conventional privacy-preserving protocols infeasible.In this paper we propose several authentication protocols that are all made of the same building blocks. More precisely, we first revise the EC-RAC (Elliptic Curve Based Randomized Access Control) protocol and we expand it into several authentication protocols. All the proposed protocols satisfy the basic requirements, which are the system scalability, un-traceability and security against cloning attacks and replay attacks, but each protocol has different security properties. The security proofs are implied by means of cryptographic reductions, i.e. they are based on the security of the Schnorr protocol and the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.

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Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Untraceable RFID authentication protocols: Revision of EC-RAC

Lee

Batina

Verbauwhede

2009

2009 IEEE International Conference on RFID

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A 5.1μJ per point‐multiplication elliptic curve cryptographic processor

Rožić

Reparaz

Verbauwhede

2016

Circuit Theory & Apps

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Security features such as privacy and device authentication are required in wireless sensor networks, electronic IDs, Radio Frequency Identification tags, and many other applications. These features are provided using cryptography. Symmetric key cryptography, where the key is distributed between the communication parties prior to communication, does not provide adequate solution for large scalable systems such as sensor networks. In these cases, public-key cryptography should be used. However, public-key algorithms are typically more computationally intensive than their symmetric key counterparts, which creates difficulties in meeting the strict area, power, and energy requirements. Elliptic curve cryptography, because of relatively small operand sizes, can be used to answer the imposed challenges. In this paper, we present a processor for elliptic curve cryptography over GF (2 163 ). This processor can perform elliptic curve point multiplication as well as general modular operations. The processor is flexible enough to support multiple cryptographic protocols. The chip is fabricated using UMC .13 m 1P8M process, resulting in a core area of 0.54 mm 2 . The energy consumption to perform one elliptic curve point multiplication is 5.1 J. The design features lightweight countermeasures against side-channel attacks. A security evaluation shows the effectiveness of such countermeasures.The ECC processor presented in[1] uses a 16 × 16 bit multiplier and a 1 Kb random-access memory (RAM) to achieve small area. However, this approach resulted in a large execution time of 251 clock cycles for a field multiplication and 296K clock cycles per PM. The design presented in[2] uses a latch based memory unit and a digit-serial data path to achieve lower execution time. Neither of these two implementations can support the basic Schnorr protocol[3] as they lack instructions for modular arithmetic operations.In this paper, we present a processor for ECC based on the architecture presented by Lee et al.[4] We make the following extensions of the previous work:• The register file was modified to reduce the number of multiplexers. • Bit-sliced architecture of the register file and the modular arithmetic logic unit (MALU) was developed. An efficient placement and routing strategy was used to minimize the interconnect capacitive loads. ‡ Area and power associated with the interconnect are not included in this analysis. Frequency values are chosen in such way that the time needed to execute the complete protocol is less than 250 ms.

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Vulnerability analysis of elliptic curve cryptography‐based RFID authentication protocols

et al. 2012

Trans. Emerging Tel. Tech.

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Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), we show that three recently proposed RFID authentication protocols which rely exclusively on the used of Elliptic Curve Cryptography are not secure against the tracking attack. To make this attack successfully, the adversary needs to execute three phases. Firstly, the attacker just eavesdrops on the messages exchanged between Server and Tag. Secondly, the attacker impersonates Server to reply with the same random number that is obtained from previous phase. Finally, the adversary acts as a man in the middle to tamper the exchanged messages. Then, we propose enhancements and prove that the revisions are secure against the tracking attack that keep other security properties. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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EC-RAC (ECDLP Based Randomized Access Control): Provably Secure RFID authentication protocol

Cited by 100 publications

References 17 publications

Untraceable RFID authentication protocols: Revision of EC-RAC

Untraceable RFID authentication protocols: Revision of EC-RAC

A 5.1μJ per point‐multiplication elliptic curve cryptographic processor

Vulnerability analysis of elliptic curve cryptography‐based RFID authentication protocols

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